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A comparative analysis of political competition and local provision of public goods : Brazil, Colombia and Mexico (1991-2010)

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  • Rojas Rivera, Angela Milena
  • Molina Guerra, Carlos Andrés

Abstract

Resumen: En esta investigación exploramos el efecto de la competencia política sobre la provisión local de bienes públicos en tres países: Brasil, Colombia y México para el período 1991-2010 usando datos municipales. Estos tres países comparten características que hacen el análisis comparativo especialmente útil en la comprensión del papel jugado por las estructuras de gobierno, las cuales incluyen el grado de descentralización económica y política. Basado en un enfoque multidimensional de la competencia política y destacando el papel de las elecciones de congreso, establecemos el efecto que ejercen diversas medidas de competencia política, basadas en las elecciones de cámara de representantes, sobre indicadores de educación primaria, sanidad y mortalidad infantil. Encontramos que Brasil exhibe la elasticidad más alta y con signos esperados en la provisión de los bienes públicos ante la mayoría de medidas de competencia política, mientras que México muestra una fuerte conexión entre estas medidas y todos los bienes públicos aunque con efectos negativos de la tasa de participación y volatilidad electoral. Colombia es el país que más baja respuesta presenta, excepto por mortalidad infantil. Atribuimos estas diferencias a las influencias provenientes de la rendición de cuentas y la disciplina de los partidos. / Abstract : We explore the effect of political competition on the local provision of public goods in three countries: Brazil, Colombia and Mexico from 1991 to 2010 using municipal data. These countries share characteristics that make a comparative analysis useful in understanding the role of governance structures, which include the degree of fiscal and political decentralization. Based on a multidimensional approach of political competition and bringing to the fore the role of congressional elections, we establish the effect of several measures of political competition based on lower chamber elections on indicators of primary education, sanitation and infant mortality. We find that Brazil displays the highest elasticity with expected signs in several public goods to most measures of political competition, while Mexico shows strong connection of political competition indicators to all public goods but negative effects of voter turnout and electoral volatility; Colombia is the least responsive except for infant mortality. These differences are attributed to influences stemming from local accountability and party discipline.

Suggested Citation

  • Rojas Rivera, Angela Milena & Molina Guerra, Carlos Andrés, 2015. "A comparative analysis of political competition and local provision of public goods : Brazil, Colombia and Mexico (1991-2010)," Borradores Departamento de Economía 17493, Universidad de Antioquia, CIE.
    • Handle: RePEc:col:000196:017493
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    1. Tobón Orozco, David & Molina, Carlos & Vargas, Harvey, 2018. "Can environmental taxes and payments for ecosystem services regulate pollution when the resilience of water bodies is surpassed?," Borradores Departamento de Economía 17179, Universidad de Antioquia, CIE.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Competencia política; Calidad de gobierno; bienes públicos locales; análisis comparativo; Brasil; Colombia; México;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • H75 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Government: Health, Education, and Welfare

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