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On Competition for Spatially Distributed Resources in Networks

Author

Listed:
  • Giorgio Fabbri

    (Univ.Grenoble Alpes, CNRS, INRIA, Grenoble INP, GAEL, Grenoble, France)

  • Silvia Faggian

    (Department of Economics, Ca' Foscari University of Venice, Italy)

  • Giuseppe Freni

    (Department of Business and Economics, University of Naples "Parthenope")

Abstract

We study the dynamics of the exploitation of a natural resource, distributed in space and mobile, where spatial diversification is introduced by a network structure. Players are assigned to different nodes by a regulator, after he/she decides at which nodes natural reserves are established. The game solution shows how the dynamics of spatial distribution depends on the productivity of the various sites, on the structure of the connections between the various locations, and on the preferences of the agents. At the same time, the best locations to host a nature reserve are identified in terms of the parameters of the model, and it turns out they correspond to the most central (in the sense of eigenvector centrality) nodes of a suitably redefined network which takes into account the nodes productivities.

Suggested Citation

  • Giorgio Fabbri & Silvia Faggian & Giuseppe Freni, 2020. "On Competition for Spatially Distributed Resources in Networks," Working Papers 2020:07, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
    • Handle: RePEc:ven:wpaper:2020:07
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Giorgio Fabbri & Silvia Faggian & Giuseppe Freni, 2023. "Growth models with externalities on networks," Working Papers 2024-04, Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL).
    2. Georgios I. Papayiannis, 2022. "Robust Policy Selection and Harvest Risk Quantification for Natural Resources Management under Model Uncertainty," Papers 2202.05326, arXiv.org.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Harvesting; spatial models; differential games; nature reserve;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
    • Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy
    • R11 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General Regional Economics - - - Regional Economic Activity: Growth, Development, Environmental Issues, and Changes
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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