Robust implementation in weakly perfect Bayesian strategies
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DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105038
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More about this item
Keywords
Robust implementation; Dynamic mechanisms; Weak rationalizability; Weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium; Dynamic robust monotonicity;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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