Pay-for-delay with Follow-on Products
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- Jorge Lemus & Emil Temnyalov, 2020. "Pay-for-Delay with Follow-On Products," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 56(4), pages 697-714, June.
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Cited by:
- Sencer Ecer & Rodrigo Montes & David Weiskopf, 2020. "On the Application of Nash Bargaining in Reverse Payment Cases in the Pharmaceutical Industry," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 133-147, August.
- Ahn, Kiefer & Trujillo, Antonio & Gibbons, Jason & Bennett, Charles L. & Anderson, Gerard, 2023. "Settled: Patent characteristics and litigation outcomes in the pharmaceutical industry," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(C).
- Anton‐Giulio Manganelli, 2021. "Reverse payments, patent strength, and asymmetric information," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 30(1), pages 20-35, January.
- Manganelli, Anton-Giulio, 2023. "Pay-for-delay settlements and patent expansion practices," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
- Roger D. Blair, 2020. "The Intellectual Property-Antitrust Interface," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 56(4), pages 557-561, June.
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More about this item
Keywords
pay-for-delay; product hopping; evergreening; antitrust; litigation;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
- K2 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law
- K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior
- L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- O3 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-COM-2020-08-10 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-LAW-2020-08-10 (Law and Economics)
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