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Great expectations: Learning the boundaries of design rights

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  • Heikkilä, Jussi
  • Peltoniemi, Mirva

Abstract

We present a case study of an increase in design right filings and concurrent design right litigations in an industry that previously had little experience of design right protection. The motives for and outcomes of filing, and how these changed over time are discussed. We go on to explore the events, which offered the decision makers opportunities to update their beliefs about the scope of design right protection. We find that filing motives changed from specific protection goals to freedom to operate over time. We also find that the actors faced several, but sometimes contradictory, learning opportunities. There are two types of learning relating to the usage of design rights: 1) learning the initial scope of protection and 2) learning the dynamism of scope that results from the growing number of designs in the product category. The evidence suggests that the scope of existing design rights is negatively affected by new design right grants. Our findings highlight the essential role of belief formation and updating in innovation activity and intellectual property rights-based competition. We conclude that uncertain design rights and information asymmetries may have fostered entrepreneurial optimism.

Suggested Citation

  • Heikkilä, Jussi & Peltoniemi, Mirva, 2019. "Great expectations: Learning the boundaries of design rights," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 48(9), pages 1-1.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:respol:v:48:y:2019:i:9:2
    DOI: 10.1016/j.respol.2019.05.004
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    Cited by:

    1. Andersson, David E. & Ekman, Anton & Huila, Anton & Tell, Fredrik, 2023. "Industrial design rights and the market value of firms," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 196(C).
    2. Herz, Benedikt & Mejer, Malwina, 2021. "The effect of design protection on price and price dispersion: Evidence from automotive spare parts," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    3. Carolina Castaldi & Kyriakos Drivas, 2023. "Relatedness, Cross-relatedness and Regional Innovation Specializations: An Analysis of Technology, Design, and Market Activities in Europe and the US," Economic Geography, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 99(3), pages 253-284, May.
    4. Herz, Benedikt & Mejer, Malwina, 2020. "The effect of design protection on price and price dispersion: Evidence from automotive spare parts," MPRA Paper 109645, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 01 Sep 2021.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Intellectual property right; Design right; Uncertainty; Beliefs; Learning;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
    • O32 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
    • O33 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Technological Change: Choices and Consequences; Diffusion Processes
    • O34 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital
    • L24 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures

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