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Do Bonus Offers Shorten Unemployment Insurance Spells? Results from the Washington Experiment

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Abstract

Unemployment insurance is intended to reduce hardship by providing labor force members with partial wage replacement during periods of involuntary unemployment. However, in performing this income maintenance function, unemployment insurance may prolong spells of unemployment. Evidence from a field experiment conducted in Illinois in 1984 suggested that offering unemployment insurance claimants a modest cash bonus for rapid reemployment would increase the speed of return to work and reduce program costs. In 1988 a similar experiment, examining several different bonus offers, was conducted in the state of Washington. Evidence from the Washington experiment indicates that bonus offers do change job seeking behavior, but that only relatively generous bonus offers-about six times the weekly benefit amount-should be expected to significantly change the behavior of people eligible for unemployment benefits.
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  • Christopher J. O'Leary & Robert G. Spiegelman & Kenneth J. Kline, "undated". "Do Bonus Offers Shorten Unemployment Insurance Spells? Results from the Washington Experiment," Upjohn Working Papers cjo19954, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
  • Handle: RePEc:upj:weupjo:cjo19954
    Note: Appears in Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 14(2): 245-269
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    1. Rebecca M. Blank & David E. Card, 1991. "Recent Trends in Insured and Uninsured Unemployment: Is There an Explanation?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 106(4), pages 1157-1189.
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    6. Patricia Anderson & Walter Corson & Paul Decker, "undated". "The New Jersey Unemployment Insurance Reemployment Demonstration Project: Follow-Up Report," Mathematica Policy Research Reports eba060d41b8145b5a230fa76b, Mathematica Policy Research.
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    Cited by:

    1. Louis S. Jacobson & Robert J. LaLonde & Daniel G. Sullivan, 2005. "Is retraining displaced workers a good investment?," Economic Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, vol. 29(Q II), pages 47-66.
    2. Christopher J. O’Leary & Paul T. Decke & Stephen A. Wandner, 2005. "Cost-Effectiveness of Targeted Reemployment Bonuses," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 40(1).
    3. van der Klaauw, B. & van Ours, J.C., 2010. "Carrot and Stick : How Reemployment Bonuses and Benefit Sanctions Affect Job Finding Rates," Discussion Paper 2010-66, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    4. Christopher J. O'Leary, 2017. "Evaluating Public Employment Programs with Field Experiments: A Survey of American Evidence," Upjohn Working Papers 17-279, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
    5. Carl Davidson & Stephen A. Woodbury, 1996. "Unemployment Insurance and Unemployment Implications of the Reemployment Bonus Experiments," Book chapters authored by Upjohn Institute researchers, in: Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation: Background Papers, volume 3, pages KK1-KK37, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
    6. Yosuke Oda, 2008. "Alteration in Skills and Career-Enhancing in a Frictional Labor Market," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 08-09, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics.
    7. repec:mpr:mprres:3507 is not listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    unemployment insurance; bonus experiments; washington state; ui;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
    • J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings

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