Eligibility, Experience Rating, and Unemployment Insurance Take-up
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- Stéphane Auray & David L. Fuller, 2020. "Eligibility, experience rating, and unemployment insurance take‐up," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(3), pages 1059-1107, July.
- Stéphane Auray & David L. Fuller, 2020. "Eligibility, experience rating, and unemployment insurance take‐up," Post-Print hal-03385921, HAL.
- Stéphane Auray & David L. Fuller, 2020. "Eligibility, experience rating, and unemployment insurance take‐up," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03385921, HAL.
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Cited by:
- Stéphane Auray & David L. Fuller, 2020.
"Eligibility, experience rating, and unemployment insurance take‐up,"
Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(3), pages 1059-1107, July.
- Stéphane Auray & David L. Fuller, 2018. "Eligibility, Experience Rating, and Unemployment Insurance Take-up," Working Papers 2018-18, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
- Stéphane Auray & David L. Fuller, 2020. "Eligibility, experience rating, and unemployment insurance take‐up," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03385921, HAL.
- Stéphane Auray & David L. Fuller, 2020. "Eligibility, experience rating, and unemployment insurance take‐up," Post-Print hal-03385921, HAL.
- Wang, Cheng & Williamson, Stephen D., 2002.
"Moral hazard, optimal unemployment insurance, and experience rating,"
Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(7), pages 1337-1371, October.
- Williamson, Stephen D. & Wang, Cheng, 1999. "Moral Hazard, Optimal Unemployment Insurance, and Experience Rating," Working Papers 99-03, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
- Wang, Cheng & Williamson, Stephen D., 2002. "Moral Hazard, Optimal Unemployment Insurance and Experience Rating," Staff General Research Papers Archive 10133, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Albertini, Julien & Fairise, Xavier & Terriau, Anthony, 2023.
"Unemployment insurance, recalls, and experience rating,"
Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 75(C).
- Julien Albertini & Xavier Fairise & Anthony Terriau, 2020. "Unemployment insurance, Recalls and Experience Rating," Working Papers halshs-02559317, HAL.
- Julien Albertini & Xavier Fairise & Anthony Terriau, 2023. "Unemployment insurance, recalls, and experience rating," Post-Print halshs-03881968, HAL.
- Julien Albertini & Xavier Fairise & Anthony Terriau, 2020. "Unemployment insurance, Recalls and Experience Rating," Working Papers 2014, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
- Julien Albertini & Xavier Fairise & Anthony Terriau, 2023. "Unemployment insurance, recalls, and experience rating," Post-Print hal-04204649, HAL.
- Mark Duggan & Audrey Guo & Andrew C. Johnston, 2023.
"Experience Rating as an Automatic Stabilizer,"
Tax Policy and the Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 37(1), pages 109-133.
- Mark Duggan & Audrey Guo & Andrew C. Johnston, 2022. "Experience Rating as an Automatic Stabilizer," NBER Chapters, in: Tax Policy and the Economy, Volume 37, pages 109-133, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Mark Duggan & Andrew C. Johnston & Audrey Guo, 2022. "Experience Rating as an Automatic Stabilizer," NBER Working Papers 30651, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Guo, Audrey & Johnston, Andrew C., 2020. "The Finance of Unemployment Compensation and its Consequence for the Labor Market," IZA Discussion Papers 13330, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
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More about this item
Keywords
Unemployment Insurance; Take-up Rate; Experience Rating; Matching Frictions; Search;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
- J32 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Nonwage Labor Costs and Benefits; Retirement Plans; Private Pensions
- J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
- J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-IAS-2019-04-01 (Insurance Economics)
- NEP-MAC-2019-04-01 (Macroeconomics)
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