Collective Choice Rules on Convex Restricted Domains
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DOI: 10.26481/umamet.2008003
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References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Jamal Nazrul Islam & Haradhan Kumar Mohajan & Pahlaj Moolio, 2009.
"Political Economy and Social Welfare with Voting Procedure,"
KASBIT Business Journals (KBJ), Khadim Ali Shah Bukhari Institute of Technology (KASBIT), vol. 2, pages 42-66, December.
- Islam, Jamal & Mohajan, Haradhan & Moolio, Pahlaj, 2009. "Political Economy and Social Welfare with Voting Procedure," MPRA Paper 50671, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 25 Sep 2009.
- Can, Burak & Storcken, Ton, 2013.
"Update monotone preference rules,"
Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 136-149.
- Can, B. & Storcken, A.J.A., 2011. "Update monotone preference rules," Research Memorandum 048, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- repec:ksb:journl:v:2:y:2009:i:1:p:42-66 is not listed on IDEAS
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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-GTH-2008-03-08 (Game Theory)
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