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Another induction proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem

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  • Cato, Susumu

Abstract

This paper provides an alternative proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem.

Suggested Citation

  • Cato, Susumu, 2009. "Another induction proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 105(3), pages 239-241, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:105:y:2009:i:3:p:239-241
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Eric Maskin, 1999. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 66(1), pages 23-38.
    2. Muller, Eitan & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1977. "The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 412-418, April.
    3. Navin Aswal & Shurojit Chatterji & Arunava Sen, 2003. "Dictatorial domains," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 22(1), pages 45-62, August.
    4. Reny, Philip J., 2001. "Arrow's theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: a unified approach," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 99-105, January.
    5. Sen, Arunava, 2001. "Another direct proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 70(3), pages 381-385, March.
    6. Barbera, Salvador, 1983. "Strategy-Proofness and Pivotal Voters: A Direct Proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 24(2), pages 413-417, June.
    7. Kim, Ki Hang & Roush, Fred W., 1980. "Special domains and nonmanipulability," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 85-92, September.
    8. Satterthwaite, Mark Allen, 1975. "Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 187-217, April.
    9. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
    10. Barbera, S. & Peleg, B., 1988. "Strategy-Proof Voting Schemes With Continuous Preferences," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 91.88, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    11. Kalai, Ehud & Muller, Eitan, 1977. "Characterization of domains admitting nondictatorial social welfare functions and nonmanipulable voting procedures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 457-469, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Uuganbaatar Ninjbat, 2015. "Impossibility theorems are modified and unified," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 45(4), pages 849-866, December.
    2. Ninjbat, Uuganbaatar, 2012. "Another direct proof for the Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 116(3), pages 418-421.
    3. Cato, Susumu, 2011. "Maskin monotonicity and infinite individuals," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 110(1), pages 56-59, January.

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