IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/arx/papers/2402.06024.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

A Generalization of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem Through Combinatorial Topology

Author

Listed:
  • Isaac Lara

    (Centro de Estudios Econ\'omicos, El Colegio de M\'exico)

  • Sergio Rajsbaum

    (Instituto de Matem\'aticas, Universidad Nacional Aut\'onoma de M\'exico)

  • Armajac Ravent'os-Pujol

    (Departamento de Econom\'ia, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid)

Abstract

To the best of our knowledge, a complete characterization of the domains that escape the famous Arrow's impossibility theorem remains an open question. We believe that different ways of proving Arrovian theorems illuminate this problem. This paper presents a new combinatorial topology proof of Arrow's theorem. In PODC 2022, Rajsbaum and Ravent\'os-Pujol proved this theorem using a combinatorial topology approach. This approach uses simplicial complexes to represent the sets of profiles of preferences and that of single preferences. These complexes grow in dimension with the number of alternatives. This makes it difficult to think about the geometry of Arrow's theorem when there are (any) finite number of voters and alternatives. Rajsbaum and Ravent\'os-Pujol (2022) use their combinatorial topology approach only for the base case of two voters and three alternatives and then proceed by induction to prove the general version. The problem with this strategy is that it is unclear how to study domain restrictions in the general case by focusing on the base case and then using induction. Instead, the present article uses the two-dimensional structure of the high-dimensional simplicial complexes (formally, the $2$$\unicode{x2013}$skeleton), yielding a new combinatorial topology proof of this theorem. Moreover, we do not assume the unrestricted domain, but a domain restriction that we call the class of polarization and diversity over triples, which includes the unrestricted domain. By doing so, we obtain a new generalization of Arrow's theorem. This shows that the combinatorial topology approach can be used to study domain restrictions in high dimensions through the $2$$\unicode{x2013}$skeleton.

Suggested Citation

  • Isaac Lara & Sergio Rajsbaum & Armajac Ravent'os-Pujol, 2024. "A Generalization of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem Through Combinatorial Topology," Papers 2402.06024, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2024.
  • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2402.06024
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://arxiv.org/pdf/2402.06024
    File Function: Latest version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gaertner,Wulf, 2006. "Domain Conditions in Social Choice Theory," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521028745.
    2. Edith Elkind & Martin Lackner & Dominik Peters, 2022. "Preference Restrictions in Computational Social Choice: A Survey," Papers 2205.09092, arXiv.org.
    3. Yuliy Baryshnikov & Joseph Root, 2023. "A Topological Proof of The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem," Papers 2309.03123, arXiv.org.
    4. Michel Regenwetter & A.A.J. Marley & Bernard Grofman, 2003. "General concepts of value restriction and preference majority," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 21(1), pages 149-173, August.
    5. Ehud Kalai & Eitan Muller & Mark Satterthwaite, 1979. "Social welfare functions when preferences are convex, strictly monotonic, and continuous," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 87-97, March.
    6. Blair, Douglas & Muller, Eitan, 1983. "Essential aggregation procedures on restricted domains of preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 34-53, June.
    7. Scott Feld & Bernard Grofman, 1986. "Research note Partial single-peakedness: An extension and clarification," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 51(1), pages 71-80, January.
    8. Bengt Hansson, 1976. "The existence of group preference functions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 89-98, December.
    9. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
    10. Bernard Grofman & Michel Regenwetter, 1998. "Choosing subsets: a size-independent probabilistic model and the quest for a social welfare ordering," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 15(3), pages 423-443.
    11. Kalai, Ehud & Muller, Eitan, 1977. "Characterization of domains admitting nondictatorial social welfare functions and nonmanipulable voting procedures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 457-469, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Kim Border, 1984. "An impossibility theorem for spatial models," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 43(3), pages 293-305, January.
    2. Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno, 2020. "Arrow on domain conditions: a fruitful road to travel," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 54(2), pages 237-258, March.
    3. Teo Chung Piaw & Jay Sethuraman & Rakesh V. Vohra, 2001. "Integer Programming and Arrovian Social Welfare Functions," Discussion Papers 1316, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    4. Susumu Cato, 2022. "Stable preference aggregation with infinite population," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 59(2), pages 287-304, August.
    5. Pierre Batteau, 1978. "Stability of Aggregation Procedures, Ultrafilters and Simple Games," Discussion Papers 318, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    6. Francesca Busetto & Giulio Codognato & Simone Tonin, 2017. "Nondictatorial Arrovian Social Welfare Functions, Simple Majority Rule and Integer Programming," Working Papers 2017_11, Durham University Business School.
    7. Sethuraman, Jay & Teo, Chung-Piaw & Vohra, Rakesh V., 2006. "Anonymous monotonic social welfare functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 128(1), pages 232-254, May.
    8. Wesley H. Holliday & Eric Pacuit, 2020. "Arrow’s decisive coalitions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 54(2), pages 463-505, March.
    9. Roy, Souvik & Storcken, Ton, 2019. "A characterization of possibility domains in strategic voting," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 46-55.
    10. Chatterjee, Swarnendu & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton, 2016. "Locating a public good on a sphere," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 139(C), pages 46-48.
    11. Ehud Kalai & Zvi Ritz, 1978. "An Extended Single Peak Condition in Social Choice," Discussion Papers 325, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    12. Busetto, Francesca & Codognato, Giulio & Tonin, Simone, 2014. "Integer Programming on Domains Containing Inseparable Ordered Paris," 2007 Annual Meeting, July 29-August 1, 2007, Portland, Oregon TN 2015-22, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    13. Shin Sato, 2010. "Circular domains," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 14(3), pages 331-342, September.
    14. Campbell, Donald E. & Kelly, Jerry S., 2015. "Social choice trade-off results for conditions on triples of alternatives," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 42-45.
    15. Shin Sato, 2012. "On strategy-proof social choice under categorization," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 38(3), pages 455-471, March.
    16. Csóka, Péter & Kondor, Gábor, 2019. "Delegációk igazságos kiválasztása társadalmi választások elméletével [Choosing a fair delegation by social choice theory]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(7), pages 771-787.
    17. Clemens Puppe & Attila Tasnádi, 2008. "Nash implementable domains for the Borda count," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 31(3), pages 367-392, October.
    18. Marek Pycia & M. Utku Ünver, 2021. "Arrovian Efficiency and Auditability in Discrete Mechanism Design," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 1044, Boston College Department of Economics.
    19. Mishra, Debasis, 2016. "Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in restricted domains," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 925-954.
    20. Conal Duddy, 2014. "Condorcet’s principle and the strong no-show paradoxes," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 77(2), pages 275-285, August.

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2402.06024. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: arXiv administrators (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://arxiv.org/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.