Nash implementable domains for the Borda count
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- Clemens Puppe & Attila Tasnádi, 2008. "Nash implementable domains for the Borda count," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 31(3), pages 367-392, October.
References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Ollár, Mariann, 2010. "Monotonicity and robustness of majority rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 107(2), pages 288-290, May.
- Battal Doğan & Semih Koray, 2015. "Maskin-monotonic scoring rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 44(2), pages 423-432, February.
- Sanver, M. Remzi, 2008. "Nash implementability of the plurality rule over restricted domains," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 99(2), pages 298-300, May.
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More about this item
Keywords
Maskin monotonicity; Borda count; restricted preference domains;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CDM-2006-11-12 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2006-11-12 (Game Theory)
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