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Auctions : the big winner among trading mechanisms for the Internet economy

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  • Müller, R.J.

    (Quantitative Economics)

Abstract

Auctions are probably the most important mechanism for dynamic pricing in electronic commerce. Although they constitute a very old mechanism as well, the new popularity has raisen a lot of questions on the appropriate design of an auction mechanism for a particular situation. This chapter describes reasons for auction popularity by setting them into the context of trends in electronic commerce. We then illustrate the main issues in auction design. Our analysis starts with simple single-item auctions, as we can see them in many B2C markets. We then look at the more complex auction designs, which are necessary for B2B markets. For the latter design has to take into account that buyers want to purchase collections of items and services, and that the valuation for winning collections is not simply equal to the sum of valuations of single items. We show how multi-item auction mechanisms can benefit from a synthesis of microeconomic and mathematical optimization models.
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Suggested Citation

  • Müller, R.J., 2001. "Auctions : the big winner among trading mechanisms for the Internet economy," Research Memorandum 016, Maastricht University, Maastricht Economic Research Institute on Innovation and Technology (MERIT).
  • Handle: RePEc:unm:umamer:2001016
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    1. Alvin E. Roth & Axel Ockenfels, 2000. "Last Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-Price Auctions: Theory and Evidence from a Natural Experiment on the Internet," NBER Working Papers 7729, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Babaioff, Moshe & Feldman, Michal & Nisan, Noam & Winter, Eyal, 2012. "Combinatorial agency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(3), pages 999-1034.
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    Cited by:

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    4. Duersch, Peter & Oechssler, Jörg & Schipper, Burkhard C., 2009. "Incentives for subjects in internet experiments," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 105(1), pages 120-122, October.
    5. Chesney, Thomas & Chuah, Swee-Hoon & Hoffmann, Robert, 2009. "Virtual world experimentation: An exploratory study," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 618-635, October.
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    11. Fiedler, Marina & Haruvy, Ernan, 2009. "The lab versus the virtual lab and virtual field--An experimental investigation of trust games with communication," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 716-724, November.
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    13. Drehmann, Mathias & Oechssler, Jorg & Roider, Andreas, 2007. "Herding with and without payoff externalities -- an internet experiment," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 391-415, April.
    14. Charness, Gary & Haruvy, Ernan & Sonsino, Doron, 2007. "Social distance and reciprocity: An Internet experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 88-103, May.
    15. Holm, Håkan & Nystedt, Paul, 2005. "Trust in surveys and games - a matter of money and location?," Working Papers 2005:26, Lund University, Department of Economics, revised 15 Aug 2005.
    16. Catherine Eckel & Rick Wilson, 2006. "Internet cautions: Experimental games with internet partners," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 9(1), pages 53-66, April.
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    18. Pikulina, E.S. & Renneboog, L.D.R. & Tobler, P.N., 2014. "Overconfidence, Effort, and Investment (Revised version of CentER DP 2013-035)," Other publications TiSEM 0e3cc6fd-6847-4fe5-88da-d, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    19. Duersch, Peter & Oechssler, Jörg & Schipper, Burkhard C., 2009. "Incentives for subjects in internet experiments," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 105(1), pages 120-122, October.
    20. Holm, Håkan & Nystedt, Paul, 2008. "Trust in surveys and games - A methodological contribution on the influence of money and location," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 522-542, August.
    21. Chesney, Thomas & Chuah, Swee-Hoon & Hoffmann, Robert, 2009. "Virtual world experimentation: An exploratory study," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 618-635, October.
    22. Emmanuel PETIT & Anna TCHERKASSOF & Xavier GASSMANN, 2012. "Sincere Giving and Shame in a Dictator Game," Cahiers du GREThA (2007-2019) 2012-25, Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée (GREThA).
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