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Combinatorial Auctions: A Survey

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  • Sven de Vries
  • Rakesh Vohra

Abstract

Many auctions involve the sale of a variety of distinct assets. Examples are airport time slots, delivery routes and furniture. Because of complimentarities (or substitution effects) between the different assets, bidders have preferences not just for particular items but for sets or bundles of items. For this reason, economic efficiency is enhanced if bidders are allowed to bid on bundles or combinations of different assets. This paper surveys the state of knowledge about the design of combinatorial auctions. Second, it uses this subject as a vehicle to convey the aspects of integer programming that are relevant for the design of such auctions and combinatorial markets in general.

Suggested Citation

  • Sven de Vries & Rakesh Vohra, 2000. "Combinatorial Auctions: A Survey," Discussion Papers 1296, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    • Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1296
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    Cited by:

    1. Holzman, Ron & Kfir-Dahav, Noa & Monderer, Dov & Tennenholtz, Moshe, 2004. "Bundling equilibrium in combinatorial auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 104-123, April.
    2. Nicolas Gruyer & Nathalie Lenoir, 2003. "Auctioning airport slots (?)," Post-Print hal-01021718, HAL.
    3. Nicolas Gruyer & Nathalie Lenoir, 2003. "Auctioning airport slots (?)," Economics Working Papers 01, LEEA (air transport economics laboratory), ENAC (french national civil aviation school).
    4. Daniel, Joseph I, 2014. "The untolled problems with airport slot constraints," Economics of Transportation, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 16-28.
    5. Dimitris Bertsimas & Ramazan Demir, 2002. "An Approximate Dynamic Programming Approach to Multidimensional Knapsack Problems," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 48(4), pages 550-565, April.
    6. Benjamin Lev, 2002. "Book Reviews," Interfaces, INFORMS, vol. 32(5), pages 95-104, October.

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