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Multi-Trait Matching and Gender Differentials in Intergenerational Mobility

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Listed:
  • Paola Conconi
  • Natalie Chen
  • Carlo Perroni

Abstract

We describe a model of multi-trait matching and inheritance in which individuals’ attractiveness in the marriage market depends on their market and non-market char- acteristics. Gender differences in social mobility can arise if market characteristics are relatively more important in determining marriage outcomes for men than they are for women, and if they are more persistent across generations than non-market char- acteristics. A reduction in gender based discrimination in the labor market increases homogamy in the marriage market and lowers social mobility for both genders.

Suggested Citation

  • Paola Conconi & Natalie Chen & Carlo Perroni, 2013. "Multi-Trait Matching and Gender Differentials in Intergenerational Mobility," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/145491, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    • Handle: RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/145491
    Note: SCOPUS: ar.j
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Patrick Legros & Andrew F. Newman, 2007. "Beauty Is a Beast, Frog Is a Prince: Assortative Matching with Nontransferabilities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(4), pages 1073-1102, July.
    2. Patrick Legros & Andrew Newman, 2007. "Beauty is a beast, frog is a prince :assortative matching in a nontransferable world," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/7022, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    3. Lalaina H. Hirvonen, 2008. "Intergenerational Earnings Mobility Among Daughters and Sons: Evidence from Sweden and a Comparison with the United States," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(5), pages 777-826, November.
    4. Gunter J. Hitsch & Ali Hortaçsu & Dan Ariely, 2010. "Matching and Sorting in Online Dating," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(1), pages 130-163, March.
    5. Becker, Gary S, 1973. "A Theory of Marriage: Part I," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(4), pages 813-846, July-Aug..
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Olivetti, Claudia & Paserman, M. Daniele & Salisbury, Laura, 2018. "Three-generation mobility in the United States, 1850–1940: The role of maternal and paternal grandparents," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 73-90.
    2. Schwenkenberg, Julia M., 2014. "Occupations and the evolution of gender differences in intergenerational socioeconomic mobility," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 124(3), pages 348-352.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Social mobility; Matching; Inheritance; Wage gap;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
    • J62 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Job, Occupational and Intergenerational Mobility; Promotion

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