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An Economic Analysis of the Droit de Suite

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  • Solow, J.

    (University of Iowa)

Abstract

The droit de suite, or resale royalty right, entitles an artist to a percentage of either the price received when her works are resold by their owners. This paper analyzes the effect of this law on the artist's production when early and late works are either substitutes or complements. By giving the artist an interest in the resale price of early works, the royalty provides a credible incentive to maintain value when later production decisions are made. Since the initial sales price capitalizes the stream of future values, the benefit of higher resale prices accrues to the artist.

Suggested Citation

  • Solow, J., 1991. "An Economic Analysis of the Droit de Suite," Working Papers 91-14, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:uia:iowaec:91-14
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Karp, Larry & Perloff, Jeffrey M, 1992. "Legal Requirements that Artists Receive Resale Royalties," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt33f9k5bw, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
    2. Karp, Larry S. & Perloff, Jeffery M., 1993. "Legal requirements that artists receive resale royalties," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 163-177, June.
    3. Filer, Randall K, 1986. "The "Starving Artist"-Myth or Reality? Earnings of Artists in the United States," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(1), pages 56-75, February.
    4. Nancy L. Stokey, 1981. "Rational Expectations and Durable Goods Pricing," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 12(1), pages 112-128, Spring.
    5. Baumol, William J, 1986. "Unnatural Value: Or Art Investment as Floating Crap Game," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 10-14, May.
    6. Coase, Ronald H, 1972. "Durability and Monopoly," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 15(1), pages 143-149, April.
    7. Kahn, Charles M, 1986. "The Durable Goods Monopolist and Consistency with Increasing Costs," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(2), pages 275-294, March.
    8. repec:bla:econom:v:56:y:1989:i:224:p:523-27 is not listed on IDEAS
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Michael Rushton, 2001. "The Law and Economics of Artists' Inalienable Rights," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer;The Association for Cultural Economics International, vol. 25(4), pages 243-257, November.
    2. Sir Alan Peacock, 2000. "Public financing of the arts in England," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 21(2), pages 171-205, June.
    3. Victor Ginsburgh, 2011. "Resale Rights," Chapters, in: Ruth Towse (ed.), A Handbook of Cultural Economics, Second Edition, chapter 55, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    4. Michael Rushton, 2011. "Artists’ Rights," Chapters, in: Ruth Towse (ed.), A Handbook of Cultural Economics, Second Edition, chapter 8, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    5. Richard Watt (ed.), 2014. "Handbook on the Economics of Copyright," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 14240.
    6. Chanont Banternghansa & Kathryn Graddy, 2011. "The impact of the Droit de Suite in the UK: an empirical analysis," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer;The Association for Cultural Economics International, vol. 35(2), pages 81-100, May.
    7. Bronwyn Coate & Tim R.L. Fry, 2012. "Better off Dead? Prices Realised for Australian Paintings Sold at Auction," ACEI Working Paper Series AWP-02-2012, Association for Cultural Economics International, revised Feb 2012.
    8. Henry Hansmann, "undated". "Royalties for Artists Versus Royalties for Authors and Composers," Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy Working Paper Series yale_lepp-1023, Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy.
    9. Richard Watt, 2014. "Copyright in visual art markets: some economic theory concerning resale royalties and other options," Chapters, in: Richard Watt (ed.), Handbook on the Economics of Copyright, chapter 18, pages 328-342, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    10. Ruth Towse, 2006. "Copyright And Artists: A View From Cultural Economics," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(4), pages 567-585, September.
    11. Kim Oosterlinck & Anne-Sophie Radermecker, 2021. "Regulation or Reputation? Evidence from the Art Market," Working Papers CEB 21-006, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    12. Henry Hansmann & Marina Santilli, 2001. "Royalties for Artists versus Royalties for Authors and Composers," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer;The Association for Cultural Economics International, vol. 25(4), pages 259-281, November.
    13. Francesco Angelini & Massimiliano Castellani & Pierpaolo Pattitoni, 2023. "You can’t export that! Export ban for modern and contemporary Italian art," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 56(3), pages 533-557, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    art and law; durable goods; resale; royalties;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Z10 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - General
    • K39 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Other

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