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A (New) Country Insurance Facility

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  • Tito Cordella y Eduardo Levy Yeyati

Abstract

To cope with the self-fulfilling liquidity runs that triggered many recent financial crises, we propose the creation of a country insurance facility. The facility, which we envisage as complementary to the existing multilateral lending facilities, would provide eligible countries with automatic access to a credit line at a predetermined interest rate. Eligibility criteria should be easily verifiable, focus on debt sustainability, and take into account the currency and maturity composition of the debt. Other critical design issues considered here include the size of the facility, its duration and charges, and the exit costs for a country that loses eligibility.

Suggested Citation

  • Tito Cordella y Eduardo Levy Yeyati, 2005. "A (New) Country Insurance Facility," Business School Working Papers newcountryins, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella.
  • Handle: RePEc:udt:wpbsdt:newcountryins
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    Cited by:

    1. Daniel Kapp & Marco Vega, 2014. "Real output costs of financial crises: A loss distribution approach," Cuadernos de Economía - Spanish Journal of Economics and Finance, Asociación Cuadernos de Economía, vol. 37(103), pages 13-28, Abril.
    2. Scheubel, Beatrice & Stracca, Livio, 2019. "What do we know about the global financial safety net? A new comprehensive data set," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 99(C).
    3. Barry Eichengreen & Poonam Gupta & Ashoka Mody, 2008. "Sudden Stops and IMF-Supported Programs," NBER Chapters, in: Financial Markets Volatility and Performance in Emerging Markets, pages 219-266, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Mr. Eduardo Levy Yeyati & Mr. Alain Ize & Miguel A. Kiguel, 2005. "Managing Systemic Liquidity Risk in Financially Dollarized Economies," IMF Working Papers 2005/188, International Monetary Fund.
    5. Guido Sandleris & Filippo Taddei, 2007. "Indexed Sovereign Debt: a Survey and a Framework of Analysis," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 66, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
    6. Fernández-Arias, Eduardo, 2010. "Multilateral Safety Nets for Financial Crises," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 1508, Inter-American Development Bank.
    7. Nancy Birdsall, 2006. "A Stability and Social Investment Facility for High Debt Countries," Working Papers 77, Center for Global Development.
    8. Didier, Tatiana & Mauro, Paolo & Schmukler, Sergio L., 2008. "Vanishing financial contagion?," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 30(5), pages 775-791.
    9. Barry Eichengreen, 2007. "Insurance Underwriter or Financial Development Fund: What Role for Reserve Pooling in Latin America?," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 27-52, February.
    10. Antonio Francisco A. Silva Jr, 2011. "The Self-insurance Role of International Reserves and the 2008-2010 Crisis," Working Papers Series 256, Central Bank of Brazil, Research Department.
    11. World Bank, 2008. "Country Insurance : Reducing Systemic Vulnerabilities in Latin America and the Caribbean," World Bank Publications - Reports 8010, The World Bank Group.
    12. Guido Sandleris & Horacio Sapriza & Filippo Taddei, 2008. "Indexed Sovereign Debt: An Applied Framework," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 104, Collegio Carlo Alberto, revised 2011.
    13. Presbitero, Andrea F. & Zazzaro, Alberto, 2012. "IMF Lending in Times of Crisis: Political Influences and Crisis Prevention," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 40(10), pages 1944-1969.
    14. Mr. Jonathan David Ostry & Mr. Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2005. "Strengthening IMF Crisis Prevention," IMF Working Papers 2005/206, International Monetary Fund.
    15. José Antonio Ocampo & Stephany Griffith-Jones, 2007. "A counter-cyclical framework for a development-friendly international financial architecture," Working Papers 39, United Nations, Department of Economics and Social Affairs.
    16. Suman Basu & Ran Bi & Prakash Kannan, 2010. "Regional reserve pooling arrangements," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue Oct.
    17. Scheubel, Beatrice & Herrala, Risto & Stracca, Livio, 2016. "What do we know about the global financial safety net? Data, rationale and possible evolution," VfS Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145676, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    18. Stracca, Livio & Scheubel, Beatrice, 2016. "What do we know about the global financial safety net? Rationale, data and possible evolution," Occasional Paper Series 177, European Central Bank.
    19. Magdalena Redo & Marta Gebska, 2020. "Globalization in Growing Financial Markets as a Threat to the Financial Security of the Global Economy," European Research Studies Journal, European Research Studies Journal, vol. 0(Special 1), pages 335-355.
    20. Eduardo Levy Yeyati, 2008. "Liquidity Insurance in a Financially Dollarized Economy," NBER Chapters, in: Financial Markets Volatility and Performance in Emerging Markets, pages 185-218, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    21. Eduardo Fernández-Arias & Eduardo Levy-Yeyati, 2012. "Global Financial Safety Nets: Where Do We Go from Here?," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(1), pages 37-68, April.
    22. Daniel Kapp & Marco Vega, 2012. "Real Output Costs of Financial Crises: A Loss Distribution Approach," Papers 1201.0967, arXiv.org, revised May 2012.
    23. Irwin, Gregor & Penalver, Adrian & Salmon, Chris & Taylor, Ashley, 2008. "Dealing with country diversity: challenges for the IMF credit union model," Bank of England working papers 349, Bank of England.
    24. Alain Ize & Miguel Kiguel & Eduardo Levy Yeyati, 2005. "Managing Systemic Liquidity Risk in Financially Dollarized Economy," Business School Working Papers managsystrisk, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella.
    25. Daniel Kapp, 2012. "The optimal size of the European Stability Mechanism: A cost-benefit analysis," DNB Working Papers 349, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.

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