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Bank Supervision Russian style: Rules versus Enforcement and Tacit Objectives

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  • Sophie Claeys,
  • Gleb Lanine
  • Koen Schoors

Abstract

We focus on the conflict between two central bank objectives, namely individual bank stability and systemic stability. We study the licensing policy of the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) in 1999-2002. Banks in poorly banked regions, banks that are too big to be disciplined adequately and banks that are active on the interbank market enjoy protection from license withdrawal, showing a tacit concern for systemic stability. The CBR is also reluctant to withdraw licenses from banks that violate the individuals??? deposits to capital ratio, because this conflicts with the tacit CBR objective to secure depositor trust and systemic stability.

Suggested Citation

  • Sophie Claeys, & Gleb Lanine & Koen Schoors, 2005. "Bank Supervision Russian style: Rules versus Enforcement and Tacit Objectives," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series wp778, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    • Handle: RePEc:wdi:papers:2005-778
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    Cited by:

    1. Koen Schoors & Konstantin Sonin, 2005. "Passive Creditors," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(1), pages 57-86, March.
    2. Claeys, Sophie, 2005. "Optimal regulatory design for the Central Bank of Russia," BOFIT Discussion Papers 7/2005, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition.
    3. Christa Hainz, 2007. "Business Groups in Emerging Markets: Financial Control and Sequential Investments," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 163(2), pages 336-355, June.
    4. Claeys, Sophie, 2005. "Optimal regulatory design for the Central Bank of Russia," BOFIT Discussion Papers 7/2005, Bank of Finland Institute for Emerging Economies (BOFIT).
    5. G. Lanine & R. Vander Vennet, 2005. "Failure prediction in the Russian bank sector with logit and trait recognition models," Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium 05/329, Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration.
    6. repec:zbw:bofitp:2005_007 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Christa Hainz, 2006. "Business Groups in Emerging Markets-Financial Control & Sequential Investment," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series wp830, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    8. Denis Shibitov & Mariam Mamedli, 2019. "The finer points of model comparison in machine learning: forecasting based on russian banks’ data," Bank of Russia Working Paper Series wps43, Bank of Russia.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bank supervision; bank crisis; Russia.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services
    • N2 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions
    • E5 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit

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