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Regulación en los mercados eléctricos competitivos

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  • Mario Ibarburu

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to describe the degrees of freedom, and hence the alternatives faced, in designing the electrical markets in general. In a second stage, the analysis is modified so as to study the Argentinian and Brazilian cases, with special emphasis on the expected outcomes for Uruguay. The comparative analysis of the three countries is intended to capture the different microeconomic puzzles to be solved in each case and the diversity of the regulatory frameworks in which solutions can be found using some general concepts related to competition in the energy markets, both the one in which generation takes place and that in which commercialization occurs.

Suggested Citation

  • Mario Ibarburu, 2001. "Regulación en los mercados eléctricos competitivos," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 0801, Department of Economics - dECON.
    • Handle: RePEc:ude:wpaper:0801
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    File URL: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12008/1938
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    10. Aleksandr Rudkevich & Max Duckworth & Richard Rosen, 1998. "Modeling Electricity Pricing in a Deregulated Generation Industry: The Potential for Oligopoly Pricing in a Poolco," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 3), pages 19-48.
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