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Understanding how market power can arise in network competition: a game theoretic approach

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  • Berry, Carolyn A.
  • Hobbs, Benjamin F.
  • Meroney, William A.
  • O'Neill, Richard P.
  • StewartJr, William R.

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  • Berry, Carolyn A. & Hobbs, Benjamin F. & Meroney, William A. & O'Neill, Richard P. & StewartJr, William R., 1999. "Understanding how market power can arise in network competition: a game theoretic approach," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 139-158, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:juipol:v:8:y:1999:i:3:p:139-158
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Hogan, William W., 1997. "Transmission rights, through the looking-glass: a false dichotomy between active and passive trading," The Electricity Journal, Elsevier, vol. 10(8), pages 86-91, October.
    2. Shmuel S. Oren, 1997. "Economic Inefficiency of Passive Transmission Rights in Congested Electricity Systems with Competitive Generation," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 1), pages 63-83.
    3. Hogan, William W, 1992. "Contract Networks for Electric Power Transmission," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 4(3), pages 211-242, September.
    4. Green, Richard J, 1996. "Increasing Competition in the British Electricity Spot Market," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(2), pages 205-216, June.
    5. Severin Borenstein & James Bushnell, 1999. "An Empirical Analysis of the Potential for Market Power in California’s Electricity Industry," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(3), pages 285-323, September.
    6. Benjamin F. Hobbs & Richard E. Schuler, 1985. "An Assessment Of The Deregulation Of Electric Power Generation Using Network Models Of Imperfect Spatial Markets," Papers in Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(1), pages 75-89, January.
    7. SMEERS, Yves, 1997. "Computable equilibrium models and the restructuring of the European electricity and gas markets," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1997061, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    8. Yves Smeers, 1997. "Computable Equilibrium Models and the Restructuring of the European Electricity and Gas Markets," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 4), pages 1-31.
    9. David M. Newbery, 1995. "Power Markets and Market Power," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 3), pages 39-66.
    10. Hobbs, Benjamin F. & Kelly, Kevin A., 1992. "Using game theory to analyze electric transmission pricing policies in the United States," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 154-171, January.
    11. Cardell, Judith B. & Hitt, Carrie Cullen & Hogan, William W., 1997. "Market power and strategic interaction in electricity networks," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(1-2), pages 109-137, March.
    12. Green, Richard J & Newbery, David M, 1992. "Competition in the British Electricity Spot Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(5), pages 929-953, October.
    13. Steven Stoft, 1999. "Financial Transmission Rights Meet Cournot: How TCCs Curb Market Power," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 1), pages 1-23.
    14. Oren, Shmuel S., 1997. "Passive transmission rights will not do the job," The Electricity Journal, Elsevier, vol. 10(5), pages 22-33, June.
    15. Stoft, Steven, 1997. "Transmission rights and wrongs," The Electricity Journal, Elsevier, vol. 10(8), pages 91-95, October.
    16. Aleksandr Rudkevich & Max Duckworth & Richard Rosen, 1998. "Modeling Electricity Pricing in a Deregulated Generation Industry: The Potential for Oligopoly Pricing in a Poolco," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 3), pages 19-48.
    17. Smeers, Y., 1997. "Computable equilibrium models and the restructuring of the European electricity and gas markets," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1280, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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