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Stay a Little Longer? Teacher Turnover, Retention and Quality in Disadvantaged Schools

Author

Listed:
  • Asma Benhenda

    (Centre for Education Policy and Equalising Opportunities, UCL Institute of Education, University College London)

  • Julien Grenet

    (Paris School of Economics)

Abstract

Using French administrative data on secondary school teachers, we analyze a non-pecuniary, "career-path oriented" centralized incentive scheme designed to attract and retain teachers in French disadvantaged schools. We rely on a major reform of the structure of this incentive scheme to identify its effect on teacher turnover, retention, and quality in disadvantaged schools. We find this incentive scheme has a statistically significant positive effect on the number of consecutive years teachers stay in disadvantaged schools and decreases the probability of in- experienced teachers in disadvantaged schools to leave the profession. However, we find no statistically significant effect on the teacher experience gap nor the student achievement gap between disadvantaged and non disadvantaged schools.

Suggested Citation

  • Asma Benhenda & Julien Grenet, 2020. "Stay a Little Longer? Teacher Turnover, Retention and Quality in Disadvantaged Schools," CEPEO Working Paper Series 20-03, UCL Centre for Education Policy and Equalising Opportunities, revised Jan 2020.
  • Handle: RePEc:ucl:cepeow:20-03
    as

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    File URL: https://repec-cepeo.ucl.ac.uk/cepeow/cepeowp20-03.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Clotfelter, Charles & Glennie, Elizabeth & Ladd, Helen & Vigdor, Jacob, 2008. "Would higher salaries keep teachers in high-poverty schools? Evidence from a policy intervention in North Carolina," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(5-6), pages 1352-1370, June.
    2. repec:adr:anecst:y:2013:i:111-112:p:7 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Raj Chetty & John N. Friedman & Jonah E. Rockoff, 2014. "Measuring the Impacts of Teachers I: Evaluating Bias in Teacher Value-Added Estimates," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(9), pages 2593-2632, September.
    4. Corinne Prost, 2013. "Teacher Mobility: Can Financial Incentives Help Disadvantaged Schools to Retain Their Teachers?," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 111-112, pages 171-191.
    5. Eric A. Hanushek & EJohn F. Kain & Steven G. Rivkin, 2004. "Why Public Schools Lose Teachers," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 39(2).
    6. Jonah E. Rockoff, 2004. "The Impact of Individual Teachers on Student Achievement: Evidence from Panel Data," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(2), pages 247-252, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Julien Silhol & Lionel Wilner, 2022. "Teachers' Desired Mobility to Disadvantaged Schools: Do Financial Incentives Matter?," CESifo Working Paper Series 9906, CESifo.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    teachers; teacher mobility; teacher retention; educational inequalities; education prioritaire;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education
    • I22 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Educational Finance; Financial Aid
    • J20 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - General

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