IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/tiu/tiutis/cf34a879-fd1c-4588-9646-74dbf4c71cb7.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

John Nash and the analysis of rational behavior

Author

Listed:
  • van Damme, E.E.C.

    (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management)

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • van Damme, E.E.C., 2000. "John Nash and the analysis of rational behavior," Other publications TiSEM cf34a879-fd1c-4588-9646-7, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiutis:cf34a879-fd1c-4588-9646-74dbf4c71cb7
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://pure.uvt.nl/ws/portalfiles/portal/19148010/John_Nash_and_the_analysis_of_rational_behavior_2000.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    2. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
    3. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Guth, Werner & Ritzberger, Klaus & van Damme, Eric, 2004. "On the Nash bargaining solution with noise," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 697-713, June.
    2. Güth, Werner, 1998. "Sequential versus independent commitment: An indirect evolutionary analysis of bargaining rules," SFB 373 Discussion Papers 1998,5, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
    3. Takeuchi, Ai & Veszteg, Róbert F. & Kamijo, Yoshio & Funaki, Yukihiko, 2022. "Bargaining over a jointly produced pie: The effect of the production function on bargaining outcomes," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 169-198.
    4. Vincent Martinet & Pedro Gajardo & Michel De Lara & Héctor Ramírez Cabrera, 2011. "Bargaining with intertemporal maximin payoffs," EconomiX Working Papers 2011-7, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
    5. Laruelle, Annick & Valenciano, Federico, 2007. "Bargaining in committees as an extension of Nash's bargaining theory," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 291-305, January.
    6. Okada, Akira, 2010. "The Nash bargaining solution in general n-person cooperative games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(6), pages 2356-2379, November.
    7. Chander, Parkash & Wooders, Myrna, 2020. "Subgame-perfect cooperation in an extensive game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 187(C).
    8. Haruo Imai & Hannu Salonen, 2012. "A characterization of a limit solution for finite horizon bargaining problems," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 41(3), pages 603-622, August.
    9. Cho, In-Koo & Matsui, Akihiko, 2013. "Search theory, competitive equilibrium, and the Nash bargaining solution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(4), pages 1659-1688.
    10. Suchan Chae & Seho Kim, 2019. "The effects of third-party transfers in sequential anchored bargaining," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(1), pages 143-155, March.
    11. Hanato, Shunsuke, 2019. "Simultaneous-offers bargaining with a mediator," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 361-379.
    12. Robert J. Weber, 1985. "Negotiation and Arbitration: A Game-Theoretic Perspective," Discussion Papers 666, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    13. Dilip Abreu & David G. Pearce, 2006. "Reputational Wars of Attrition with Complex Bargaining Postures," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000001218, David K. Levine.
    14. Binmore, Ken & Osborne, Martin J. & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1992. "Noncooperative models of bargaining," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 7, pages 179-225, Elsevier.
    15. Faruk Gul, 1997. "A Nobel Prize for Game Theorists: The Contributions of Harsanyi, Nash and Selten," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(3), pages 159-174, Summer.
    16. John M. Crespi & Jennifer S. James, 2007. "Bargaining rationale for cooperative generic advertising," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 51(4), pages 445-457, December.
    17. Johannes Spinnewijn & Frans Spinnewyn, 2015. "Revising claims and resisting ultimatums in bargaining problems," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 19(2), pages 91-116, June.
    18. Binmore, Ken & Samuelson, Larry & Young, Peyton, 2003. "Equilibrium selection in bargaining models," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 296-328, November.
    19. Joan Esteban & József Sákovics, 2002. "Endogenous bargaining power," Economics Working Papers 644, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    20. Charness, Gary & Kuhn, Peter, 2011. "Lab Labor: What Can Labor Economists Learn from the Lab?," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 3, pages 229-330, Elsevier.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:tiu:tiutis:cf34a879-fd1c-4588-9646-74dbf4c71cb7. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Richard Broekman (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.tilburguniversity.edu/about/schools/economics-and-management/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.