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A Nobel Prize for Game Theorists: The Contributions of Harsanyi, Nash and Selten

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  • Faruk Gul

Abstract

The purpose of this essay is to celebrate the contributions of John C. Harsanyi, John F. Nash, and Reinhard Selten to economics. The emphasis is on tracing the influence of their work on economic analysis rather than giving a detailed account of each of their contributions. The three researchers are identified with the three most important ideas in game theory: equilibrium, asymmetric information, and credibility. These three ideas have dominated not only theoretical research but also numerous other fields within economics since the 1950s.

Suggested Citation

  • Faruk Gul, 1997. "A Nobel Prize for Game Theorists: The Contributions of Harsanyi, Nash and Selten," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(3), pages 159-174, Summer.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:jecper:v:11:y:1997:i:3:p:159-74
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/jep.11.3.159
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    File URL: http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jep.11.3.159
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    3. Nuno Costa & João Lourenço, 2022. "Bi-Objective Optimization Problems—A Game Theory Perspective to Improve Process and Product," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(22), pages 1-14, November.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • B31 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought: Individuals - - - Individuals
    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General

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