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Equilibrium selection in the Spence signaling game

Author

Listed:
  • Guth, W.
  • van Damme, E.E.C.

    (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management)

Abstract

The paper studies the most simple version of the Spence job market signaling model in which there are just 2 types of workers while education is not productivity increasing. To eliminate the multiplicity of equilibria, the general equilibrium selection theory of John Harsanyi and Reinhard Selten is applied. It is shown that this theory selects Wilson's E2-equilibrium as the solution.
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Suggested Citation

  • Guth, W. & van Damme, E.E.C., 1989. "Equilibrium selection in the Spence signaling game," Other publications TiSEM b07518f4-8066-4c5b-b38d-2, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiutis:b07518f4-8066-4c5b-b38d-21b35a5c7ead
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384, April.
    2. Hajime Miyazaki, 1977. "The Rat Race and Internal Labor Markets," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 8(2), pages 394-418, Autumn.
    3. In-Koo Cho & David M. Kreps, 1987. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 102(2), pages 179-221.
    4. Kohlberg, Elon & Mertens, Jean-Francois, 1986. "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1003-1037, September.
    5. McAleer, Michael & McKenzie, C R, 1991. "Keynesian and New Classical Models of Unemployment Revisited," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 101(406), pages 359-381, May.
    6. Marini, Giancarlo & van der Ploeg, Frederick, 1988. "Monetary and Fiscal Policy in an Optimising Model with Capital Accumulation and Finite Lives," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 98(392), pages 772-786, September.
    7. Binmore, Ken, 1987. "Modeling Rational Players: Part I," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 3(2), pages 179-214, October.
    8. Mertens, J.-F., 1988. "Stable equilibria - a reformulation," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1988038, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    9. Wilson, Charles, 1977. "A model of insurance markets with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 167-207, December.
    10. Michael Spence, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 87(3), pages 355-374.
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