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Does it take Three to Make Two Happy? An Experimental Study on Bargaining with Mediation

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  • Schroeter, K.
  • Vyrastekova, J.

    (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management)

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  • Schroeter, K. & Vyrastekova, J., 2003. "Does it take Three to Make Two Happy? An Experimental Study on Bargaining with Mediation," Other publications TiSEM 7b59003e-9364-477c-91fc-7, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiutis:7b59003e-9364-477c-91fc-77a04a4fc34c
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    14. Croson, Rachel & Boles, Terry & Murnighan, J. Keith, 2003. "Cheap talk in bargaining experiments: lying and threats in ultimatum games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 143-159, June.
    15. Kagel, John H. & Kim, Chung & Moser, Donald, 1996. "Fairness in Ultimatum Games with Asymmetric Information and Asymmetric Payoffs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 100-110, March.
    16. James Andreoni, 2001. "Giving According to GARP," Theory workshop papers 339, UCLA Department of Economics.
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