Bargaining under large risk - an experimental analysis
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DOI: 10.1080/00779950903005481
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- Werner Guth & Sabine Kroger & Ernst Maug, 2006. "Bargaining under Large Risk - An Experimental Analysis -," Cahiers de recherche 0637, CIRPEE.
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More about this item
Keywords
negotiation experiment; ultimatum bargaining; parameter calibration; movie production; risk sharing;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
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