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Probabilistic Coalition Structure Theories

Author

Listed:
  • H. Andrew Michener

    (Department of Sociology, University of Wisconsin-Madison)

  • Daniel J. Myers

    (Department of Sociology, University of Notre Dame)

Abstract

This article reports a comparative test of the central-union theory in four-person sidepayment games. Predictions by two variants of central-union theory (CU-1 and CU-2) are tested vis-Ã -vis predictions by three other solutions (the equal excess model, the Myerson-Shapley solution, and the kernel). With respect to players' payoffs, results show that CU-1, CU-2, equal excess, and Myerson-Shapley models have essentially equal predictive accuracy and that all of these are superior to the kernel in the test games. However, when coalition structure probability predictions are incorporated in the test, both CU-1 and CU-2 emerge as more accurate than all the other models tested.

Suggested Citation

  • H. Andrew Michener & Daniel J. Myers, 1998. "Probabilistic Coalition Structure Theories," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 42(6), pages 830-860, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:42:y:1998:i:6:p:830-860
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002798042006007
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Michael Maschler, 1963. "The Power of a Coalition," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 10(1), pages 8-29, October.
    2. H. Michener & Daniel Myers, 1998. "An Empirical Comparison of Probabilistic Coalition Structure Theories in 3-Person Sidepayment Games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 45(1), pages 37-82, August.
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    6. SCHMEIDLER, David, 1969. "The nucleolus of a characteristic function game," LIDAM Reprints CORE 44, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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    9. Andrew Postlewaite, 1974. "Disadvantageous Syndicates in Exchange Economies," Discussion Papers 105, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    10. M. Maschler & B. Peleg & L. S. Shapley, 1979. "Geometric Properties of the Kernel, Nucleolus, and Related Solution Concepts," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 4(4), pages 303-338, November.
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