Equilibrium selection in the Spence signaling game
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Other versions of this item:
- Guth, W. & Van Damme, E., 1989. "Equilibrium Selection In The Spence Signaling Game," Papers 8939, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
- Guth, W. & van Damme, E.E.C., 1989. "Equilibrium selection in the Spence signaling game," Other publications TiSEM b07518f4-8066-4c5b-b38d-2, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- van Damme, E.E.C. & Guth, W., 1992. "Equilibrium selection in the spence signaling game," Other publications TiSEM 4b9118b1-ca01-4c5f-a1df-6, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
References listed on IDEAS
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