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Bank resolution and public backstop in an asymmetric banking union

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  • Segura, Anatoli
  • Vicente, Sergio

Abstract

This paper characterizes the optimal banking union with endogenous participation in a two-country economy in which domestic bank failures may be contemporaneous to sovereign crises, giving rise to risk-sharing motives to mutualize the funding of bail-outs. Raising public funds to conduct a bail-out entails the deadweight loss of distortionary taxation. Bank bail-ins create disruption costs in the economy. When country asymmetry is large, resolution policies exhibit reduced contributions to the public backstop and forbearance in early bank intervention in the fiscally stronger country, facilitating bail-outs in this country. JEL Classification: G01, G21, G28

Suggested Citation

  • Segura, Anatoli & Vicente, Sergio, 2018. "Bank resolution and public backstop in an asymmetric banking union," ESRB Working Paper Series 83, European Systemic Risk Board.
  • Handle: RePEc:srk:srkwps:201883
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Grund, Sebastian & Nomm, Nele & Walch, Florian, 2020. "Liquidity in resolution: comparing frameworks for liquidity provision across jurisdictions," Occasional Paper Series 251, European Central Bank.
    2. Martynova, Natalya & Perotti, Enrico & Suarez, Javier, 2022. "Capital forbearance in the bank recovery and resolution game," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 146(3), pages 884-904.
    3. König, Philipp Johann & Mayer, Paul & Pothier, David, 2022. "Optimal timing of policy interventions in troubled banks," Discussion Papers 10/2022, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    4. Patrick Bolton & Martin Oehmke, 2019. "Bank Resolution and the Structure of Global Banks," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 32(6), pages 2384-2421.
    5. Bolton, Patrick & Oehmke, Martin, 2019. "Bank resolution and the structure of global banks," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 90056, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    6. Elena Carletti & Giovanni Dell’Ariccia & Robert Marquez, 2021. "Supervisory Incentives in a Banking Union," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(1), pages 455-470, January.
    7. Gersbach, Hans & Haller, Hans & Papageorgiou, Stylianos, 2020. "Regulatory competition in banking: Curse or blessing?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 121(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    bail-in; bailout; banking union; mechanism design; public backstop;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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