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Bank Resolution and the Structure of Global Banks

Author

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  • Patrick Bolton
  • Martin Oehmke

Abstract

We study the resolution of global banks by national regulators. Single-point-of-entry (SPOE) resolution, where loss-absorbing capital is shared across jurisdictions, is efficient but may not be implementable. First, when expected transfers across jurisdictions are too asymmetric, national regulators fail to set up SPOE resolution ex ante. Second, when required ex-post transfers are too large, national regulators ring-fence assets instead of cooperating in SPOE resolution. In this case, a multiple-point-of-entry (MPOE) resolution, where loss-absorbing capital is preassigned, is more robust. Our analysis highlights a fundamental link between efficient bank resolution and the operational structures and risks of global banks.

Suggested Citation

  • Patrick Bolton & Martin Oehmke, 2018. "Bank Resolution and the Structure of Global Banks," NBER Working Papers 24737, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:24737
    Note: CF
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    Blog mentions

    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. E Pluribus Unum: single vs. multiple point of entry resolution
      by Steve Cecchetti and Kim Schoenholtz in Money, Banking and Financial Markets on 2018-12-03 13:22:14

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Homma, Yasutake & Suzuki, Katsushi, 2023. "TLAC bonds and bank risk-taking," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 87(C).
    2. Koetter, Michael & Krause, Thomas & Sfrappini, Eleonora & Tonzer, Lena, 2022. "Completing the European Banking Union: Capital cost consequences for credit providers and corporate borrowers," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 148(C).
    3. Lambrecht, Bart & Tse, Alex, 2019. "Liquidation, bailout, and bail-in: Insolvency resolution mechanisms and bank lending," CEPR Discussion Papers 13734, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Xuan Wang, 2019. "When Do Currency Unions Benefit From Default ?," 2019 Papers pwa938, Job Market Papers.
    5. White, Lucy & Walther, Ansgar, 2019. "Rules versus Discretion in Bank Resolution," CEPR Discussion Papers 14048, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Segura, Anatoli & Vicente, Sergio, 2018. "Bank resolution and public backstop in an asymmetric banking union," ESRB Working Paper Series 83, European Systemic Risk Board.
    7. Xuan Wang, 2021. "Bankruptcy Codes and Risk Sharing of Currency Unions," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 21-009/IV, Tinbergen Institute.
    8. Schilling, Linda, 2017. "Optimal Forbearance of Bank Resolution," MPRA Paper 112409, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Toni Ahnert & Kartik Anand & Prasanna Gai & James Chapman & Philip StrahanEditor, 2019. "Asset Encumbrance, Bank Funding, and Fragility," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 32(6), pages 2422-2455.
    10. Götz, Martin & Tröger, Tobias & Wahrenburg, Mark, 2019. "The next SSM term: Supervisory challenges ahead," SAFE White Paper Series 59, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
    11. Thomas Conlon & John Cotter, 2019. "Subordinate Resolution ‐‐ An Empirical Analysis of European Union Subsidiary Banks," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(4), pages 857-876, July.
    12. Giulio Velliscig & Maurizio Polato & Josanco Floreani & Enrica Bolognesi, 2024. "The bail-in credibility: barking dogs seldom bite," Journal of Banking Regulation, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 25(1), pages 1-19, March.
    13. Aldasoro, Iñaki & Hardy, Bryan & Jager, Maximilian, 2022. "The Janus face of bank geographic complexity," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 134(C).
    14. Schürhoff, Norman & Dimopoulos, Theodosios Sakis, 2021. "Self-inflicted debt crises," CEPR Discussion Papers 15781, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    15. Leanza, Luca & Sbuelz, Alessandro & Tarelli, Andrea, 2021. "Bail-in vs bail-out: Bank resolution and liability structure," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
    16. Marinelli, Giuseppe & Nobili, Andrea & Palazzo, Francesco, 2022. "The multiple dimensions of bank complexity: Effects on credit risk-taking," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 134(C).
    17. José Alejandro Fernández Fernández, 2020. "Considerations of the SPE and MPE resolution," Journal of Banking Regulation, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 21(3), pages 278-287, September.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation

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