Bank capital regulation: are local or central regulators better?
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- Haritchabalet, Carole & Lepetit, Laetitia & Spinassou, Kévin & Strobel, Frank, 2017. "Bank capital regulation: Are local or central regulators better?," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 103-114.
- Carole Haritchabalet & Laetitia Lepetit & Kévin Spinassou & Frank Strobel, 2015. "Bank capital regulation: are local or central regulators better?," Post-Print hal-02440532, HAL.
- Carole Haritchabalet & Laetitia Lepetit & Kévin Spinassou & Frank Strobel, 2016. "Bank capital regulation: are local or central regulators better?," Working Papers hal-02939054, HAL.
- Carole Haritchabalet & Laetitia Lepetit & Kévin Spinassou & Frank Strobel, 2016. "Bank capital regulation: are local or central regulators better?," Working papers of CATT hal-02939054, HAL.
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Cited by:
- Douglas da Rosa München & Herbert Kimura, 2020. "Regulatory Banking Leverage: what do you know?," Working Papers Series 540, Central Bank of Brazil, Research Department.
- Nguyen, James & Parsons, Richard & Argyle, Bronson, 2021. "An examination of diversification on bank profitability and insolvency risk in 28 financially liberalized markets," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(C).
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More about this item
Keywords
Capital requirement; Spillover; Regulatory capture; Financial architecture; Bank regulation;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
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