IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cpr/ceprdp/13032.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Bank Resolution and the Structure of Global Banks

Author

Listed:
  • Bolton, Patrick
  • Oehmke, Martin

Abstract

We study the resolution of global banks by national regulators. Single-point-of-entry (SPOE) resolution, where loss-absorbing capital is shared across jurisdictions, is efficient but may not be implementable. First, when expected transfers across jurisdictions are too asymmetric, national regulators fail to set up SPOE resolution ex ante. Second, when required ex-post transfers are too large, national regulators ring-fence assets instead of cooperating in SPOE resolution. In this case, a multiple-point-of- entry (MPOE) resolution, where loss-absorbing capital is pre-assigned, is more robust. Our analysis highlights a fundamental link between efficient bank resolution and the operational structures and risks of global banks.

Suggested Citation

  • Bolton, Patrick & Oehmke, Martin, 2018. "Bank Resolution and the Structure of Global Banks," CEPR Discussion Papers 13032, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13032
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://cepr.org/publications/DP13032
    Download Restriction: CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Patrick Bolton & Xavier Freixas, 2006. "Corporate Finance and the Monetary Transmission Mechanism," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 19(3), pages 829-870.
    2. Duffie, Darrell, 2014. "Resolution of Failing Central Counterparties," Research Papers 3256, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    3. Arvind Krishnamurthy & Annette Vissing-Jorgensen, 2012. "The Aggregate Demand for Treasury Debt," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 120(2), pages 233-267.
    4. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, 2000. "Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, vol. 24(Win), pages 14-23.
    5. Krishnamurthy, Arvind & Vissing-Jorgensen, Annette, 2015. "The impact of Treasury supply on financial sector lending and stability," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 118(3), pages 571-600.
    6. Calzolari, Giacomo & Loranth, Gyongyi, 2011. "Regulation of multinational banks: A theoretical inquiry," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 178-198, April.
    7. Hughes, Joseph P. & Mester, Loretta J., 2013. "Who said large banks don’t experience scale economies? Evidence from a risk-return-driven cost function," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 559-585.
    8. Cerutti, Eugenio & Dell'Ariccia, Giovanni & Martinez Peria, Maria Soledad, 2007. "How banks go abroad: Branches or subsidiaries?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(6), pages 1669-1692, June.
    9. Patrick Bolton & Xavier Freixas, 2000. "Equity, Bonds, and Bank Debt: Capital Structure and Financial Market Equilibrium under Asymmetric Information," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(2), pages 324-351, April.
    10. Klein, Benjamin, 1974. "Competitive Interest Payments on Bank Deposits and the Long-Run Demand for Money," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(6), pages 931-949, December.
    11. Stefan Nagel, 2016. "The Liquidity Premium of Near-Money Assets," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 131(4), pages 1927-1971.
    12. Thorsten Beck & Radomir Todorov & Wolf Wagner, 2013. "Supervising cross-border banks: theory, evidence and policy [Is the international convergence of capital adequacy regulation desirable?]," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 28(73), pages 5-44.
    13. Gyöngyi Lóránth & Alan D. Morrison, 2007. "Deposit Insurance, Capital Regulations, and Financial Contagion in Multinational Banks," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 34(5‐6), pages 917-949, June.
    14. Thorsten Beck & Wolf Wagner, 2016. "Supranational Supervision: How Much and for Whom?," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 12(2), pages 221-268, June.
    15. Schoenmaker, Dirk, 2013. "Governance of International Banking: The Financial Trilemma," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199971596.
    16. Jean-Edouard Colliard, 2020. "Optimal Supervisory Architecture and Financial Integration in a Banking Union [Is the international convergence of capital adequacy regulation desirable?]," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 24(1), pages 129-161.
    17. Suarez, Javier & Mendicino, Caterina & Nikolov, Kalin, 2017. "Equity versus Bail-in Debt in Banking: An Agency Perspective," CEPR Discussion Papers 12104, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    18. Calomiris, Charles W & Kahn, Charles M, 1991. "The Role of Demandable Debt in Structuring Optimal Banking Arrangements," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(3), pages 497-513, June.
    19. Bebchuk, Lucian Arye & Guzman, Andrew T, 1999. "An Economic Analysis of Transnational Bankruptcies," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 42(2), pages 775-808, October.
    20. Douglas W. Diamond & Raghuram G. Rajan, 2001. "Liquidity Risk, Liquidity Creation, and Financial Fragility: A Theory of Banking," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(2), pages 287-327, April.
    21. Gyöngyi Lóránth & Alan D. Morrison, 2007. "Deposit Insurance, Capital Regulations, and Financial Contagion in Multinational Banks," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 34(5-6), pages 917-949.
    22. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    23. Berger, Allen N. & Hunter, William C. & Timme, Stephen G., 1993. "The efficiency of financial institutions: A review and preview of research past, present and future," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(2-3), pages 221-249, April.
    24. Robin Greenwood & Samuel G. Hanson & Jeremy C. Stein, 2015. "A Comparative-Advantage Approach to Government Debt Maturity," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 70(4), pages 1683-1722, August.
    25. David A. Skeel Jr., 2014. "Single Point of Entry and the Bankruptcy Alternative," Book Chapters, in: Martin Neil Baily & John B. Taylor (ed.), Across the Great Divide: New Perspectives on the Financial Crisis, chapter 15, Hoover Institution, Stanford University.
    26. Dell'Ariccia, Giovanni & Marquez, Robert, 2006. "Competition among regulators and credit market integration," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 401-430, February.
    27. Mark J. Flannery, 2014. "Contingent Capital Instruments for Large Financial Institutions: A Review of the Literature," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 6(1), pages 225-240, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Homma, Yasutake & Suzuki, Katsushi, 2023. "TLAC bonds and bank risk-taking," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 87(C).
    2. Koetter, Michael & Krause, Thomas & Sfrappini, Eleonora & Tonzer, Lena, 2022. "Completing the European Banking Union: Capital cost consequences for credit providers and corporate borrowers," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 148(C).
    3. Lambrecht, Bart & Tse, Alex, 2019. "Liquidation, bailout, and bail-in: Insolvency resolution mechanisms and bank lending," CEPR Discussion Papers 13734, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Xuan Wang, 2019. "When Do Currency Unions Benefit From Default ?," 2019 Papers pwa938, Job Market Papers.
    5. White, Lucy & Walther, Ansgar, 2019. "Rules versus Discretion in Bank Resolution," CEPR Discussion Papers 14048, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Segura, Anatoli & Vicente, Sergio, 2018. "Bank resolution and public backstop in an asymmetric banking union," ESRB Working Paper Series 83, European Systemic Risk Board.
    7. Xuan Wang, 2021. "Bankruptcy Codes and Risk Sharing of Currency Unions," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 21-009/IV, Tinbergen Institute.
    8. Schilling, Linda, 2017. "Optimal Forbearance of Bank Resolution," MPRA Paper 112409, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Toni Ahnert & Kartik Anand & Prasanna Gai & James Chapman & Philip StrahanEditor, 2019. "Asset Encumbrance, Bank Funding, and Fragility," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 32(6), pages 2422-2455.
    10. Götz, Martin & Tröger, Tobias & Wahrenburg, Mark, 2019. "The next SSM term: Supervisory challenges ahead," SAFE White Paper Series 59, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
    11. Thomas Conlon & John Cotter, 2019. "Subordinate Resolution ‐‐ An Empirical Analysis of European Union Subsidiary Banks," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(4), pages 857-876, July.
    12. Giulio Velliscig & Maurizio Polato & Josanco Floreani & Enrica Bolognesi, 2024. "The bail-in credibility: barking dogs seldom bite," Journal of Banking Regulation, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 25(1), pages 1-19, March.
    13. Aldasoro, Iñaki & Hardy, Bryan & Jager, Maximilian, 2022. "The Janus face of bank geographic complexity," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 134(C).
    14. Schürhoff, Norman & Dimopoulos, Theodosios Sakis, 2021. "Self-inflicted debt crises," CEPR Discussion Papers 15781, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    15. Leanza, Luca & Sbuelz, Alessandro & Tarelli, Andrea, 2021. "Bail-in vs bail-out: Bank resolution and liability structure," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
    16. Marinelli, Giuseppe & Nobili, Andrea & Palazzo, Francesco, 2022. "The multiple dimensions of bank complexity: Effects on credit risk-taking," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 134(C).
    17. José Alejandro Fernández Fernández, 2020. "Considerations of the SPE and MPE resolution," Journal of Banking Regulation, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 21(3), pages 278-287, September.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Bolton, Patrick & Oehmke, Martin, 2018. "Bank resolution and the structure of global banks," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 118937, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    2. Bolton, Patrick & Oehmke, Martin, 2019. "Bank resolution and the structure of global banks," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 90056, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    3. Patrick Bolton & Martin Oehmke, 2019. "Bank Resolution and the Structure of Global Banks," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 32(6), pages 2384-2421.
    4. Beck, Thorsten & Silva-Buston, Consuelo & Wagner, Wolf, 2023. "The Economics of Supranational Bank Supervision," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 58(1), pages 324-351, February.
    5. Kreamer, Jonathan, 2022. "Financial intermediation and the supply of liquidity," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 61(C).
    6. Mark Egan & Stefan Lewellen & Adi Sunderam, 2017. "The Cross Section of Bank Value," NBER Working Papers 23291, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Calzolari, Giacomo & Loranth, Gyongyi, 2011. "Regulation of multinational banks: A theoretical inquiry," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 178-198, April.
    8. Crosignani, Matteo, 2021. "Bank capital, government bond holdings, and sovereign debt capacity," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 141(2), pages 693-704.
    9. Ampudia, Miguel & Beck, Thorsten & Beyer, Andreas & Colliard, Jean-Edouard & Leonello, Agnese & Maddaloni, Angela & Marqués-Ibáñez, David, 2019. "The architecture of supervision," Working Paper Series 2287, European Central Bank.
    10. Beck, T.H.L. & Todorov, R.I. & Wagner, W.B., 2012. "Supervising Cross-Border Banks : Theory, Evidence and Policy (Revised version of CentER Discussion Paper 2011-127)," Other publications TiSEM 1aedf83e-1ca5-44b5-bc6d-d, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    11. Thomas M. Eisenbach & Gregory Phelan, 2022. "Fragility of Safe Asset Markets," Staff Reports 1026, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    12. Okahara, Naoto, 2018. "銀行の資本構成と自己資本比率規制 [Banks' capital structures and capital regulations]," MPRA Paper 89869, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Haritchabalet, Carole & Lepetit, Laetitia & Spinassou, Kévin & Strobel, Frank, 2017. "Bank capital regulation: Are local or central regulators better?," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 103-114.
    14. Niepmann, Friederike, 2015. "Banking across borders," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(2), pages 244-265.
    15. Krishnamurthy, Arvind & Vissing-Jorgensen, Annette, 2015. "The impact of Treasury supply on financial sector lending and stability," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 118(3), pages 571-600.
    16. Elena Carletti & Giovanni Dell’Ariccia & Robert Marquez, 2021. "Supervisory Incentives in a Banking Union," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(1), pages 455-470, January.
    17. Matteo Crosignani, 2015. "Why Are Banks Not Recapitalized During Crises?," Working Papers 203, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank).
    18. Fecht, Falko & Inderst, Roman & Pfeil, Sebastian, 2015. "A theory of the boundaries of banks with implications for financial integration and regulation," IMFS Working Paper Series 87, Goethe University Frankfurt, Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability (IMFS).
    19. Beck, T.H.L. & Todorov, R.I. & Wagner, W.B., 2011. "Bank Supervision Going Global? A Cost-Benefit Analysis (Replaced by EBC DP 2012-015)," Other publications TiSEM 2c7d7637-bd3a-4a43-beac-3, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    20. Maier, Ulf, 2016. "Multinational banks: Supranational resolution regimes and the importance of capital regulation," Discussion Papers in Economics 29630, University of Munich, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bank resolution; Single point of entry;

    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13032. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cepr.org .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.