Corporate Governance Externalities
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- Viral V. Acharya & Paolo F. Volpin, 2010. "Corporate Governance Externalities," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 14(1), pages 1-33.
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More about this item
Keywords
Corporate governance; Executive compensation; Externality; Governance standards; Ownership structure; Regulation;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
- J63 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Turnover; Vacancies; Layoffs
- K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-BEC-2008-04-12 (Business Economics)
- NEP-CFN-2008-04-12 (Corporate Finance)
- NEP-CSE-2008-04-12 (Economics of Strategic Management)
- NEP-LAW-2008-04-12 (Law and Economics)
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