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Large Distributional Games with Traits

Author

Listed:
  • M. Ali Khan

    (Department of Economics, Johns Hopkins University)

  • Kali P. Rath

    (Department of Economics, University of Notre Dame)

  • Haomiao Yu

    (Department of Economics, Ryerson University)

  • Yongchao Zhang

    (School of Economics, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics)

Abstract

A comprehensive theory of large strategic games with (socioeconomic and biological) traits (LSGT) has recently been presented in Khan et al. (2012 a and b), and in this paper, we present a reformulation pertaining to large distributional games with traits (LDGT). In addition to a generalization of work initiated and advocated by Mas-Colell (1984), we delineate the role of saturated spaces, as studied in Keisler-Sun (2009) in the reformulated theory, and consider questions pertaining to \lq\lq realizations" of equilibrium distributions that were not previously asked.

Suggested Citation

  • M. Ali Khan & Kali P. Rath & Haomiao Yu & Yongchao Zhang, 2012. "Large Distributional Games with Traits," Working Papers 037, Toronto Metropolitan University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:rye:wpaper:wp037
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Noguchi, Mitsunori, 2009. "Existence of Nash equilibria in large games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(1-2), pages 168-184, January.
    2. Khan, M. Ali & Rath, Kali P. & Sun, Yeneng & Yu, Haomiao, 2013. "Large games with a bio-social typology," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(3), pages 1122-1149.
    3. George A. Akerlof & Rachel E. Kranton, 2000. "Economics and Identity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 115(3), pages 715-753.
    4. William A. Brock & Steven N. Durlauf, 2001. "Discrete Choice with Social Interactions," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 68(2), pages 235-260.
    5. Khan, M. Ali & Yeneng, Sun, 1995. "Pure strategies in games with private information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(7), pages 633-653.
    6. George A. Akerlof & Rachel E. Kranton, 2002. "Identity and Schooling: Some Lessons for the Economics of Education," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 40(4), pages 1167-1201, December.
    7. Khan, M. Ali & Sun, Yeneng, 2002. "Non-cooperative games with many players," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 46, pages 1761-1808, Elsevier.
    8. Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1984. "On a theorem of Schmeidler," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 201-206, December.
    9. Blume, Lawrence E. & Brock, William A. & Durlauf, Steven N. & Ioannides, Yannis M., 2010. "Identification of Social Interactions," Economics Series 260, Institute for Advanced Studies.
    10. Rath, Kali P., 1996. "Existence and upper hemicontinuity of equilibrium distributions of anonymous games with discontinuous payoffs," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 305-324.
    11. Charalambos D. Aliprantis & Kim C. Border, 2006. "Infinite Dimensional Analysis," Springer Books, Springer, edition 0, number 978-3-540-29587-7, December.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Wu, Bin, 2022. "On pure-strategy Nash equilibria in large games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 305-315.
    2. Jian Yang, 2023. "Nonatomic game with general preferences over returns," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(3), pages 861-889, September.
    3. Khan, Mohammed Ali & Rath, Kali P. & Yu, Haomiao & Zhang, Yongchao, 2017. "On the equivalence of large individualized and distributionalized games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(2), May.
    4. M. Ali Khan & Yongchao Zhang, 2017. "Existence of pure-strategy equilibria in Bayesian games: a sharpened necessity result," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(1), pages 167-183, March.
    5. Fu, Haifeng & Wu, Bin, 2018. "On the characterization of Nash equilibrium action distributions of large distributional games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 168(C), pages 82-84.
    6. Fang, Chuyi & Wu, Bin, 2019. "Socially-maximal Nash equilibrium distributions in large distributional games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 40-42.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Large game; strategic game; distributional game; traits; saturated probability space; realization; Nash equilibrium distribution;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
    • D50 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - General
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G13 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Contingent Pricing; Futures Pricing

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