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Summary of the Workshop to Support Implementing the Minimum 25 Percent Public Benefit Allocation in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative

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  • Burtraw, Dallas

    (Resources for the Future)

  • Palmer, Karen

    (Resources for the Future)

Abstract

On July 20, 2006, in New York City, Resources for the Future convened a workshop of stakeholders and state officials engaged in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) together with experts on various aspects of using auctions. The workshop provided technical assistance to states for the development of a plan to satisfy the requirement for an allocation of emissions allowances to benefit consumers or for strategic energy purposes. The workshop included an overview of auction theory, a panel on concerns of stakeholders about using an allowance auction in the RGGI, a panel on the motivations for and lessons from using auctions in other applications, and one on past experiences with auctions of emissions allowances. This workshop summary presents the main ideas presented by speakers and the audience. The summary concludes by drawing on the discussion to compile a suggested roadmap identifying steps for planners in moving toward implementation of the auction.

Suggested Citation

  • Burtraw, Dallas & Palmer, Karen, 2006. "Summary of the Workshop to Support Implementing the Minimum 25 Percent Public Benefit Allocation in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative," RFF Working Paper Series dp-06-45, Resources for the Future.
    • Handle: RePEc:rff:dpaper:dp-06-45
    as

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    File URL: http://www.rff.org/RFF/documents/RFF-DP-06-45.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Porter, David & Rassenti, Stephen & Shobe, William & Smith, Vernon & Winn, Abel, 2009. "The design, testing and implementation of Virginia's NOx allowance auction," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 190-200, February.
    2. Ken Binmore & Paul Klemperer, 2002. "The Biggest Auction Ever: the Sale of the British 3G Telecom Licences," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(478), pages 74-96, March.
    3. Peter Cramton, 2002. "Spectrum Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton 01hte, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 16 Jul 2001.
    4. David H. Reiley, 2006. "Field experiments on the effects of reserve prices in auctions: more Magic on the Internet," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 37(1), pages 195-211, March.
    5. David Reiley, 2006. "Field Experiments on the Effects of Reserve Prices in Auctions: More Magic on the Internet," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 37(1), pages 195-211, Spring.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Burtraw, Dallas & Palmer, Karen & Kahn, Danny, 2010. "A symmetric safety valve," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 38(9), pages 4921-4932, September.
    2. Dallas Burtraw & Jacob Goeree & Charles A. Holt & Erica Myers & Karen Palmer & William Shobe, 2009. "Collusion in auctions for emission permits: An experimental analysis," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 28(4), pages 672-691.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    auction; allowances; emissions trading; climate;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy

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