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Online Appendix to "The dynamics of public investment under persistent electoral advantage"

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  • Marina Azzimonti

    (SUNY Stony Brook)

Abstract

Online appendix for the Review of Economic Dynamics article

Suggested Citation

  • Marina Azzimonti, 2014. "Online Appendix to "The dynamics of public investment under persistent electoral advantage"," Online Appendices 12-228, Review of Economic Dynamics.
    • Handle: RePEc:red:append:12-228
    Note: The original article was published in the Review of Economic Dynamics
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Marco Battaglini & Stephen Coate, 2007. "Inefficiency in Legislative Policymaking: A Dynamic Analysis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(1), pages 118-149, March.
    3. Marco Bassetto & Leslie McGranahan, 2009. "On the relationship between mobility, population growth, and capital spending in the United States," Working Paper Series WP-09-25, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
    4. Jon Fiva & Gisle Natvik, 2013. "Do re-election probabilities influence public investment?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 157(1), pages 305-331, October.
    5. Marina Azzimonti, 2011. "Barriers to Investment in Polarized Societies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(5), pages 2182-2204, August.
    6. Jinhui H. Bai & Roger Lagunoff, 2011. "On the Faustian Dynamics of Policy and Political Power," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 78(1), pages 17-48.
    7. Besley, Timothy & Persson, Torsten & Sturm, Daniel, 2010. "Political competition, policy and growth: theory and evidence from the United States," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 121718, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    8. Aguiar, Mark & Amador, Manuel, 2014. "Sovereign Debt," Handbook of International Economics, in: Gopinath, G. & Helpman, . & Rogoff, K. (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 0, pages 647-687, Elsevier.
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    12. Azzimonti, Marina & Talbert, Matthew, 2014. "Polarized business cycles," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 47-61.
    13. Jon Fiva & Gisle Natvik, 2013. "Do re-election probabilities influence public investment?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 157(1), pages 305-331, October.
    14. Ilzetzki, Ethan, 2011. "Rent-seeking distortions and fiscal procyclicality," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(1), pages 30-46, September.
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    17. Ruediger Bachmann & Jinhui Bai, 2013. "Politico-Economic Inequality and the Comovement of Government Purchases," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 16(4), pages 565-580, October.
    18. Devereux, Michael B. & Wen, Jean-Francois, 1998. "Political instability, capital taxation, and growth," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(9), pages 1635-1651, November.
    19. Debortoli, Davide & Nunes, Ricardo, 2010. "Fiscal policy under loose commitment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(3), pages 1005-1032, May.
    20. Davide Debortoli & Ricardo Nunes, 2013. "Lack Of Commitment And The Level Of Debt," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 11(5), pages 1053-1078, October.
    21. Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 1990. "A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and Government Debt," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 57(3), pages 403-414.
    22. Caballero, Ricardo J. & Yared, Pierre, 2010. "Future rent-seeking and current public savings," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 124-136, November.
    23. ,, 2014. "A dynamic theory of electoral competition," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(2), May.
    24. Timothy Besley & Torsten Persson & Daniel M. Sturm, 2010. "Political Competition, Policy and Growth: Theory and Evidence from the US," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 77(4), pages 1329-1352.
    25. Zheng Song, 2012. "Persistent Ideology And The Determination Of Public Policy Over Time," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 53(1), pages 175-202, February.
    26. Inman, Robert P & Fitts, Michael A, 1990. "Political Institutions and Fiscal Policy: Evidence from the U.S. Historical Record," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(0), pages 79-132.
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    Cited by:

    1. Pierre C. Boyer & Brian Roberson & Christoph Esslinger, 2024. "Public Debt and the Political Economy of Reforms," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 16(3), pages 459-491, August.
    2. Tamon Asonuma & Hyungseok Joo, 2023. "Sovereign Defaults and Debt Restructurings: Public Capital and Fiscal Constraint Tightness," School of Economics Discussion Papers 0323, School of Economics, University of Surrey.
    3. Daryna Grechyna, 2024. "Technological Progress and Political Disengagement," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Association for Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 66(2), pages 261-288, June.
    4. Grechyna, Daryna, 2021. "Mandatory spending, political polarization, and macroeconomic volatility," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
    5. Azzimonti, Marina & Talbert, Matthew, 2014. "Polarized business cycles," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 47-61.
    6. Garance Genicot & Laurent Bouton & Micael Castanheira, 2021. "Electoral Systems and Inequalities in Government Interventions [“Distributive Politics and Electoral Incentives: Evidence from Seven US State Legislatures.”]," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 19(6), pages 3154-3206.
    7. Marco Bassetto & Leslie McGranahan, 2021. "Mobility, Population Growth, and Public Capital Spending in the United States," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 41, pages 255-277, July.
    8. Alnahedh, Saad & Alhashel, Bader, 2024. "Firm executive political leanings, Washington, and stock market returns," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 476-491.
    9. Alhashel, Bader S., 2020. "Hail to the chief: The effect of political alignment with the presidency on corporate investment," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 54(C).
    10. Katarzyna Kopczewska, 2016. "Efficiency of Regional Public Investment: An NPV-Based Spatial Econometric Approach," Spatial Economic Analysis, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 11(4), pages 413-431, October.
    11. Grechyna, Daryna, 2023. "Can conflicts unite a nation?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 121(C).
    12. Daryna Grechyna, 2021. "Trade openness and political distortions," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(3), pages 644-663, November.
    13. Deng, Yuping & Wu, Yanrui & Xu, Helian, 2019. "Political turnover and firm pollution discharges: An empirical study," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 58(C).
    14. Lars-Erik Borge & Arnt O. Hopland, 2017. "Schools and public buildings in decay: the role of political fragmentation," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 85-105, February.
    15. Karakas, Leyla D., 2016. "Political turnover and the accumulation of democratic capital," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 195-213.
    16. Tamon Asonuma & Hyungseok Joo, 2021. "Public Capital and Fiscal Constraint in Sovereign Debt Crises," School of Economics Discussion Papers 0621, School of Economics, University of Surrey.
    17. Grechyna, Daryna, 2015. "Quantifying the Impact of Political Frictions on Public Policy," MPRA Paper 65266, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    18. Grechyna, Daryna, 2016. "Political frictions and public policy outcomes," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(3), pages 484-495.
    19. Michael Kumhof & Irina Yakadina, 2017. "Government Debt Bias," IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Monetary Fund, vol. 65(4), pages 675-703, November.
    20. Karakas, Leyla D., 2017. "Institutional constraints and the inefficiency in public investments," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 93-101.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H29 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Other
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • O23 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Development Planning and Policy - - - Fiscal and Monetary Policy in Development

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