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Schools and public buildings in decay: the role of political fragmentation

Author

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  • Lars-Erik Borge

    (Norwegian University of Science and Technology)

  • Arnt O. Hopland

    (Norwegian School of Economics)

Abstract

It is a widespread concern that schools and other public buildings are in poor conditions. A popular explanation is that maintenance is given too little priority in the budgetary process because politicians are shortsighted. In this paper we investigate this hypothesis using two novel survey data sets on school and general building conditions in Norwegian local governments. We use political fragmentation as a proxy for myopic behavior and provide strong empirical evidence that a high degree of political fragmentation is associated with poor building conditions, both for schools and for buildings in general. The finding is robust to handling of controls, outliers, and estimation method. We also provide evidence that lack of maintenance is the channel for poor building conditions.

Suggested Citation

  • Lars-Erik Borge & Arnt O. Hopland, 2017. "Schools and public buildings in decay: the role of political fragmentation," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 85-105, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:18:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s10101-016-0187-z
    DOI: 10.1007/s10101-016-0187-z
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Borge, Lars-Erik & Hopland, Arnt O., 2020. "Less fiscal oversight, more adjustment," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    2. Arnt O. Hopland & Sturla F. Kvamsdal & Leif K. Sandal, 2019. "An analysis of maintenance schedules for public facilities," Operations Research and Decisions, Wroclaw University of Science and Technology, Faculty of Management, vol. 29(1), pages 17-35.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    School building conditions; Political fragmentation; Shortsighted policy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures
    • H82 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Governmental Property

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