IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/pra/mprapa/68993.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Willingness to Pay for Firm Reputation: Paying for Risk Rating in the Annuity Market

Author

Listed:
  • Alcalde, Pilar
  • Vial, Bernardita

Abstract

In this paper we test the existence of a reputation premium in the context of the annuity market in Chile. This market provides an exceptionally good setting to measure consumers’ willingness to pay: retirees choose between a set of offers that vary only in the quote and the risk rating –a measure of the firm’s solvency– within each class of product. We find that willingness to pay for the reputation linked to the firm’s risk rating is statistically and economically significant. We also find a strong relationship between willingness to pay and intermediary choice, and we explore four potential sources of correlation between them.

Suggested Citation

  • Alcalde, Pilar & Vial, Bernardita, 2016. "Willingness to Pay for Firm Reputation: Paying for Risk Rating in the Annuity Market," MPRA Paper 68993, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:68993
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/68993/1/MPRA_paper_68993.pdf
    File Function: original version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Patrick Bajari & Ali Hortaçsu, 2004. "Economic Insights from Internet Auctions," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 42(2), pages 457-486, June.
    2. Nevo, Aviv, 2001. "Measuring Market Power in the Ready-to-Eat Cereal Industry," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(2), pages 307-342, March.
    3. George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2001. "Who Wants a Good Reputation?," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 68(2), pages 415-441.
    4. Rafael Rob & Arthur Fishman, 2005. "Is Bigger Better? Customer Base Expansion through Word-of-Mouth Reputation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 113(5), pages 1146-1175, October.
    5. Marco Morales & Guillermo Larraín, 2017. "The Chilean Electronic Market for Annuities (SCOMP): Reducing Information Asymmetries and Improving Competition," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 42(3), pages 389-405, July.
    6. Train,Kenneth E., 2009. "Discrete Choice Methods with Simulation," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521766555, January.
    7. Ryan C. McDevitt, 2011. "Names and Reputations: An Empirical Analysis," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 193-209, August.
    8. Luís Cabral & Ali Hortaçsu, 2010. "The Dynamics Of Seller Reputation: Evidence From Ebay," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(1), pages 54-78, March.
    9. Steven Tadelis, 1999. "What's in a Name? Reputation as a Tradeable Asset," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(3), pages 548-563, June.
    10. Bar-Isaac, Heski & Tadelis, Steven, 2008. "Seller Reputation," Foundations and Trends(R) in Microeconomics, now publishers, vol. 4(4), pages 273-351, August.
    11. Klein, Benjamin & Leffler, Keith B, 1981. "The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 615-641, August.
    12. Berry, Steven & Levinsohn, James & Pakes, Ariel, 1995. "Automobile Prices in Market Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(4), pages 841-890, July.
    13. Qin Lei, 2011. "FINANCIAL VALUE OF REPUTATION: EVIDENCE FROM THE eBAY AUCTIONS OF GMAIL INVITATIONS," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(3), pages 422-456, September.
    14. Mailath, George J. & Samuelson, Larry, 2006. "Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195300796.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Gaurab Aryal & Eduardo Fajnzylber & Maria F. Gabrielli & Manuel Willington, 2020. "Auctioning Annuities," Papers 2011.02899, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2021.
      • Gaurab Aryal & Eduardo Fajnzylber & Maria F. Gabrielli & Manuel Willington, 2020. "Auctioning Annuities," Working Papers 29, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
    2. Cristian Escudero & José L. Ruiz, 2022. "Choosing the highest annuity payout: the role of intermediation and firm reputation," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 47(4), pages 973-1004, October.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Bernardita Vial & Felipe Zurita, 2013. "Reputation-Driven Industry Dynamics," Documentos de Trabajo 436, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
    2. Jolivet, Grégory & Jullien, Bruno & Postel-Vinay, Fabien, 2016. "Reputation and prices on the e-market: Evidence from a major French platform," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 59-75.
    3. Alcalde, Pilar & Vial, Bernardita, 2022. "Implicit trade‐offs in replacement rates: Consumer preferences for firms, intermediaries and annuity attributes," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 82(C).
    4. Liu, Qingmin & Skrzypacz, Andrzej, 2014. "Limited records and reputation bubbles," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 151(C), pages 2-29.
    5. Bernardita Vial & Felipe Zurita, 2017. "Entrants' Reputation And Industry Dynamics," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 58(2), pages 529-559, May.
    6. Schumacher, Heiner, 2014. "Incentives through consumer learning about tastes," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 170-177.
    7. Bernardita Vial & Felipe Zurita, 2013. "Incentives and Reputation when Names can be Replaced: Valjean Reinvented as Monsieur Madeleine," Documentos de Trabajo 447, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
    8. Cabral, Luís, 2016. "Media exposure and corporate reputation," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(4), pages 735-740.
    9. Grégory Jolivet & Bruno Jullien & Fabien Postel-Vinay, 2014. "Reputation and Pricing on the e-Market: Evidence from a Major French Platform," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03460312, HAL.
    10. Jie Bai, 2016. "Melons as Lemons: Asymmetric Information, Consumer Learning and Seller Reputation," Natural Field Experiments 00540, The Field Experiments Website.
    11. W. Bentley MacLeod, 2006. "Reputations, Relationships and the Enforcement of Incomplete Contracts," CESifo Working Paper Series 1730, CESifo.
    12. Jeanine Miklós-Thal, 2012. "Linking reputations through umbrella branding," Quantitative Marketing and Economics (QME), Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 335-374, September.
    13. Gary Bolton & Ben Greiner & Axel Ockenfels, 2013. "Engineering Trust: Reciprocity in the Production of Reputation Information," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 59(2), pages 265-285, January.
    14. Miklos-Thal, Jeanine, 2008. "Linking Reputations: The Signaling and Feedback Effects of Umbrella Branding," MPRA Paper 11045, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    15. Dirk Engelmann & Jeff Frank & Alexander K. Koch & Marieta Valente, 2023. "Second‐chance offers and buyer reputation systems: theory and evidence on auctions with default," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 54(3), pages 484-511, September.
    16. Joyee Deb, 2012. "Observability and Sorting in a Market for Names," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(2), pages 301-338, June.
    17. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/4firg7dmo68rdasf15hi85vn53 is not listed on IDEAS
    18. Belleflamme,Paul & Peitz,Martin, 2015. "Industrial Organization," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107687899, January.
    19. Bruno Jullien & In-Uck Park, 2014. "New, Like New, or Very Good? Reputation and Credibility," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 81(4), pages 1543-1574.
    20. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/4firg7dmo68rdasf15hi85vn53 is not listed on IDEAS
    21. Lippert, Steffen & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2011. "Networks of relations and Word-of-Mouth Communication," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 202-217, May.
    22. Hortacsu, Ali, 2005. "Trust and Reputation on eBay: Micro and Macro Perspectives," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt8vj7d50q, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    reputation premium; willingness to pay; demand estimation; annuity markets;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D12 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
    • D53 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Financial Markets
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:68993. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Joachim Winter (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/vfmunde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.