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Names and Reputations: An Empirical Analysis

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  • Ryan C. McDevitt

Abstract

This paper tests several predictions from the literature on firm reputation, and confirms a main result: poor performance leads a firm to conceal its reputation. A residential plumbing firm with a record of complaints one standard deviation above the mean is 133.2 percent more likely to change its name. In addition, firms with longer track records are less likely to change their names or exit, while firms with more firm-specific investments, such as advertising, are more likely to change their names than exit. In addition, firms in small markets value their reputations comparatively more than firms in large markets. (JEL L14, L25, L84)

Suggested Citation

  • Ryan C. McDevitt, 2011. "Names and Reputations: An Empirical Analysis," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 193-209, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:3:y:2011:i:3:p:193-209
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.3.3.193
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    6. Ryan C. McDevitt, 2014. ""A" Business by Any Other Name: Firm Name Choice as a Signal of Firm Quality," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 122(4), pages 909-944.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Acton, Riley K., 2022. "Is a name change a game change? The impact of college-to-university conversions," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 88(C).
    2. Yang, Yang & Mueller, Noah J. & Croes, Robertico R., 2016. "Market accessibility and hotel prices in the Caribbean: The moderating effect of quality-signaling factors," Tourism Management, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 40-51.
    3. Ryan C. McDevitt, 2014. ""A" Business by Any Other Name: Firm Name Choice as a Signal of Firm Quality," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 122(4), pages 909-944.
    4. Bernardita Vial & Felipe Zurita, 2013. "Incentives and Reputation when Names can be Replaced: Valjean Reinvented as Monsieur Madeleine," Documentos de Trabajo 447, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
    5. Susan F. Lu & Gerard J. Wedig, 2013. "Clustering, Agency Costs and Operating Efficiency: Evidence from Nursing Home Chains," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 59(3), pages 677-694, May.
    6. Alessandro Minichilli & Annalisa Prencipe & Suresh Radhakrishnan & Gianfranco Siciliano, 2022. "What’s in a Name? Eponymous Private Firms and Financial Reporting Quality," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(3), pages 2330-2348, March.
    7. Alcalde, Pilar & Vial, Bernardita, 2016. "Willingness to Pay for Firm Reputation: Paying for Risk Rating in the Annuity Market," MPRA Paper 68993, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Elliot Anenberg & Chun Kuang & Edward Kung, 2022. "Social learning and local consumption amenities: Evidence from Yelp," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 70(2), pages 294-322, June.
    9. Bernardita Vial & Felipe Zurita, 2013. "Reputation-Driven Industry Dynamics," Documentos de Trabajo 436, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
    10. Bernardita Vial & Felipe Zurita, 2017. "Entrants' Reputation And Industry Dynamics," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 58(2), pages 529-559, May.
    11. Bart J. Bronnenberg & Jean-Pierre Dubé & Chad Syverson, 2022. "Marketing Investment and Intangible Brand Capital," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 36(3), pages 53-74, Summer.
    12. Mustafa Disli & Koen Schoors, 2019. "The Dynamic Effects Of Bank Rebranding And Familiarity Bias," Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium 19/955, Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration.
    13. Alan Benson & Aaron Sojourner & Akhmed Umyarov, 2020. "Can Reputation Discipline the Gig Economy? Experimental Evidence from an Online Labor Market," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(5), pages 1802-1825, May.
    14. Che, X. & Katayama, H. & Lee, P., 2020. "Willingness to Pay for Brand Reputation: Lessons from the Volkswagen Diesel Emissions Scandal," Working Papers 20/02, Department of Economics, City University London.
    15. Arthur Campbell & C. Matthew Leister & Yves Zenou, 2020. "Word‐of‐mouth communication and search," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 51(3), pages 676-712, September.
    16. Sharon Belenzon & Aaron K. Chatterji & Brendan Daley, 2017. "Eponymous Entrepreneurs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(6), pages 1638-1655, June.
    17. Alcalá, Francisco & González-Maestre, Miguel & Martínez-Pardina, Irene, 2014. "Information and quality with an increasing number of brands," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 109-117.
    18. Utgård, Jakob & Nygaard, Arne & Dahlstrom, Robert, 2015. "Franchising, local market characteristics and alcohol sales to minors," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 68(10), pages 2117-2124.
    19. Natividad, Gabriel, 2019. "Stunted firms: The long-term impacts of colonial taxation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 134(3), pages 525-548.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • L25 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Performance
    • L84 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Personal, Professional, and Business Services

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    1. Names and Reputations: An Empirical Analysis (AEJ:MI 2011) in ReplicationWiki

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