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Institutional interactions and economic growth: The joint effects of property rights, veto players and democratic capital

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  • Justesen, Mogens K.
  • Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter

Abstract

We investigate the possible interaction effects that the extent of property rights protection and separation of powers in a political system have on economic growth. Using analysis of panel data from more than countries over the period 1970-2010 we find that the growth effects of property rights increase when political power is divided among more veto players. When distinguishing between institutional veto players (political institutions) and partisan veto players (fractionalization among political parties), we further find that the growth effects of property rights are driven mainly by checks on the chief executive (in bicameral systems) and primarily found in countries with large stocks of democratic capital.

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  • Justesen, Mogens K. & Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter, 2013. "Institutional interactions and economic growth: The joint effects of property rights, veto players and democratic capital," MPRA Paper 51773, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:51773
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    Cited by:

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    3. Martin Roessler, 2019. "Political regimes and publicly provided goods: why democracy needs development," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 180(3), pages 301-331, September.
    4. Christian Bjørnskov, 2015. "Constitutional property rights protection and economic growth: evidence from the post-communist transition," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 247-280, September.
    5. Markus Leibrecht & Johann Scharler, 2021. "Veto players, market discipline, and structural fiscal consolidations," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 188(3), pages 361-384, September.
    6. Helfer, Helena, 2022. "Institutional hierarchies and economic growth: A bundled approach," CIW Discussion Papers 2/2022, University of Münster, Center for Interdisciplinary Economics (CIW).
    7. Yohei Tenryu, 2017. "The role of the private sector under insecure property rights," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 64(3), pages 285-311, September.
    8. Miguel-Angel Galindo-Martín & María-Soledad Castaño-Martínez & María-Teresa Méndez-Picazo, 2020. "The Relationship between Green Innovation, Social Entrepreneurship, and Sustainable Development," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(11), pages 1-19, June.
    9. Daniel L. Bennett & Hugo J. Faria & James D. Gwartney & Daniel R. Morales, 2016. "Evaluating Alternative Measures of Institutional Protection of Private Property and Their Relative Ability to Predict Economic Development," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 31(Summer 20), pages 57-78.
    10. Sen, Kunal & Pritchett, Lant & Kar, Sabyasachi & Raihan, Selim, 2016. "Democracy Versus Dictatorship? The Political Determinants of Growth Episodes," Working Paper Series rwp17-009, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
    11. Christian Bjørnskov, 2017. "Growth, Inequality, And Economic Freedom: Evidence From The U.S. States," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 35(3), pages 518-531, July.
    12. Tenryu, Yohei, 2013. "The Role of the Private Sector under Insecure Property Rights," MPRA Paper 74893, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 27 Oct 2016.
    13. Joshua Ang & Jason C. Patalinghug, 2021. "Property rights and economic growth: A dynamic GMM analysis," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 41(3), pages 1387-1398.
    14. Niclas Berggren & Christian Bjørnskov, 2022. "Academic freedom, institutions, and productivity," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 88(4), pages 1313-1342, April.
    15. Miguel-Angel Galindo-Martín & María-Soledad Castaño-Martínez & María-Teresa Méndez-Picazo, 2024. "The relationship between digitalization and entrepreneurship in expansionary and crisis economic phases," International Entrepreneurship and Management Journal, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 1999-2017, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Economic growth; institutions; property rights; veto players; democracy.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • E02 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General - - - Institutions and the Macroeconomy
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
    • O43 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Institutions and Growth
    • P14 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Property Rights
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State
    • P17 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Performance and Prospects
    • P48 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies

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