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Constitutional Property Rights Protection and Economic Growth: Evidence from the Post-Communist Transition

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  • Bjørnskov, Christian

    (Department of Economics and Business, Aarhus University)

Abstract

This paper seeks to estimate the economic growth effect of constitutional provisions for property rights protection. It does so using the unique situation in formerly communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the Caucasus where all but two introduced new constitutions after the fall of the Iron Curtain. The effects of implementing different constitutional provisions can therefore be observed in a group of countries with the same formal starting point. Estimates provide no evidence of positive effects and mainly point towards a negative conclusion: the introduction of constitutional protection of property rights is not associated with economic development in the long run, but tends to impose costs during a period of institutional transition and implementation proportional to the constitutional change.

Suggested Citation

  • Bjørnskov, Christian, 2012. "Constitutional Property Rights Protection and Economic Growth: Evidence from the Post-Communist Transition," Ratio Working Papers 189, The Ratio Institute.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:ratioi:0189
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    Cited by:

    1. Iwasaki, Ichiro & Kumo, Kazuhiro, 2016. "Decline and Growth in Transition Economies: A Meta-Analysis," CEI Working Paper Series 2016-9, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    2. Voigt, Stefan & Gutmann, Jerg, 2013. "Turning cheap talk into economic growth: On the relationship between property rights and judicial independence," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 66-73.
    3. Jerg Gutmann & Stefan Voigt, 2020. "Judicial independence in the EU: a puzzle," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 49(1), pages 83-100, February.
    4. Pece Nedanovski & Katerina Shapkova Kocevska, 2023. "Rule Of Law And Economic Growth: Evidences From South East Europe," Shaping Post-COVID World – Challenges for Economic Theory and Policy, in: Aleksandra Praščević & Miomir Jakšić & Mihail Arandarenko & Dejan Trifunović & Milutin Ješić (ed.),Shaping Post-COVID World – Challenges for Economic Theory and Policy, chapter 4, pages 67-85, Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Belgrade.
    5. Jacek LEWKOWICZ & Katarzyna METELSKA-SZANIAWSKA, 2021. "De Jure and De Facto Institutions: Implications for Law and for Economics," Ekonomista, Polskie Towarzystwo Ekonomiczne, issue 6, pages 758-776.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    property rights; constitutional political economy; transition;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General
    • O43 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Institutions and Growth
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State
    • P37 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Legal

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