IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/pra/mprapa/114871.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Globalization? Trade war? A counterbalance perspective

Author

Listed:
  • Hu, Arthur
  • Hu, Xingwei
  • Tong, Hui

Abstract

The embrace of globalization and protectionism among economies has ebbed and flowed over the past few decades. These fluctuations call for quantitative analytics to help countries improve their trade policies. Changing attitudes about globalization also imply that the best trade policies may vary over time and be country-specific. We argue that the imports and exports of all economies constitute a counterbalanced network where conflict and cooperation are two sides of the same coin. Quantitative competitiveness is then formulated for each country using a network counterbalance equilibrium. A country could improve its relative strength in the network by embracing globalization, protectionism, trade collaboration, or conflict. This paper presents the necessary conditions for globalization and trade wars, evaluates their side effects, derives national bargaining powers, identifies appropriate targets for conflict or collaboration, and recommends fair resolutions for trade conflicts. Data and events from the past twenty years support these conditions.

Suggested Citation

  • Hu, Arthur & Hu, Xingwei & Tong, Hui, 2022. "Globalization? Trade war? A counterbalance perspective," MPRA Paper 114871, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:114871
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/114871/1/MPRA_paper_114871.pdf
    File Function: original version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Robert Read, 2005. "The Political Economy of Trade Protection: The Determinants and Welfare Impact of the 2002 US Emergency Steel Safeguard Measures," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(8), pages 1119-1137, August.
    2. Chung, Sunghoon & Lee, Joonhyung & Osang, Thomas, 2016. "Did China tire safeguard save U.S. workers?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 22-38.
    3. Mercedes Delgado & Christian Ketels & Michael E. Porter & Scott Stern, 2012. "The Determinants of National Competitiveness," NBER Working Papers 18249, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1995. "Trade Wars and Trade Talks," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(4), pages 675-708, August.
    5. Ralph Ossa, 2014. "Trade Wars and Trade Talks with Data," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(12), pages 4104-4146, December.
    6. Bagwell, Kyle & Staiger, Robert W. & Yurukoglu, Ali, 2020. "“Nash-in-Nash” tariff bargaining," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
    7. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    8. Hu, Xingwei & Shapley, Lloyd S., 2003. "On authority distributions in organizations: equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 132-152, October.
    9. Harrison, Glenn W & Rutstrom, E E, 1991. "Trade Wars, Trade Negotiations and Applied Game Theory," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 101(406), pages 420-435, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Xingwei Hu, 2020. "Globalization? Trade War? A Counterbalance Perspective," Papers 2009.03436, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2024.
    2. Adib Bagh & Josh Ederington, 2024. "Equity‐efficiency tradeoffs in international bargaining," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 62(2), pages 782-804, April.
    3. Bekkers, Eddy & Teh, Robert, 2019. "Potential economic effects of a global trade conflict: Projecting the medium-run effects with the WTO global trade model," WTO Staff Working Papers ERSD-2019-04, World Trade Organization (WTO), Economic Research and Statistics Division.
    4. Bekkers, Eddy & Teh, Robert, 2019. "Potential Economic Effects of a Global Trade Conflict: Projecting the medium-run effects with the WTO Global Trade Model," Conference papers 333120, Purdue University, Center for Global Trade Analysis, Global Trade Analysis Project.
    5. Wen Li Cheng & Meng-Chun Liu & Xiaokai Yang, 2005. "A Ricardian Model With Endogenous Comparative Advantage And Endogenous Trade Policy Regimes," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: An Inframarginal Approach To Trade Theory, chapter 7, pages 109-130, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    6. He, Chuantian & Li, Chunding & Wang, Jing & Whalley, John, 2017. "The Armington assumption and the size of optimal tariffs," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 214-222.
    7. Halkos, George, 1994. "A game-theoretic approach to pollution control problems," MPRA Paper 33259, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Chunding Li & John Whalley & Chuantian He & Chuangwei Lin, 2021. "The 2008 Financial Crisis and the Lack of Retaliatory Trade Intervention," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo Group, vol. 67(1), pages 78-105.
    9. Staiger, Robert & Bagwell, Kyle & Bown, Chad, 2015. "Is the WTO Passé?," CEPR Discussion Papers 10672, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    10. Thiemo Fetzer & Carlo Schwarz, 2021. "Tariffs and Politics: Evidence from Trump’s Trade Wars," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 131(636), pages 1717-1741.
    11. Furceri, Davide & Ostry, Jonathan D. & Papageorgiou, Chris & Wibaux, Pauline, 2023. "Retaliation through Temporary Trade Barriers," CEPR Discussion Papers 17853, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    12. Joseph S Shapiro, 2021. "The Environmental Bias of Trade Policy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 136(2), pages 831-886.
    13. Kyle Bagwell & Chad P. Bown & Robert W. Staiger, 2016. "Is the WTO Passé?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 54(4), pages 1125-1231, December.
    14. Beshkar, Mostafa & Lee, Ryan, 2022. "How does import market power matter for trade agreements?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 137(C).
    15. Xiaokai Yang & Dingsheng Zhang, 2005. "Endogenous Structure Of The Division Of Labor, Endogenous Trade Policy Regime, And A Dual Structure In Economic Development," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: An Inframarginal Approach To Trade Theory, chapter 17, pages 383-406, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    16. David R. DeRemer, 2015. "Opportunities for Cooperation in Removing Prohibitive Trade Barriers," CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS 1533, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
    17. Nakamura, Masao & Zhang, Anming, 2018. "Foreign direct investment with host country market structures, with empirical application to Japan," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 43-53.
    18. Maggi, Giovanni, 2020. "Anti-lobbying gains from international agreements," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 20-34.
    19. Sébastien Jean & Ariell Reshef, 2017. "Why Trade, and What Would Be the Consequences of Protectionism?," CEPII Policy Brief 2017-18, CEPII research center.
    20. Sen, Rahul & Narayanan, Badri & Srivastava, Sadhana & Khorana, Sangeeta & Iyer, Chidambaran, 2020. "The Long-term Impact of Trade Wars and ‘Make in India on the Indian Economy," Conference papers 330229, Purdue University, Center for Global Trade Analysis, Global Trade Analysis Project.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    globalization; trade war; counterbalance equilibrium; national competitiveness; bargaining power; authority distribution;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • F11 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Neoclassical Models of Trade
    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration
    • O24 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Development Planning and Policy - - - Trade Policy; Factor Movement; Foreign Exchange Policy

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:114871. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Joachim Winter (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/vfmunde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.