IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/cesifo/v67y2021i1p78-105..html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The 2008 Financial Crisis and the Lack of Retaliatory Trade Intervention

Author

Listed:
  • Chunding Li
  • John Whalley
  • Chuantian He
  • Chuangwei Lin

Abstract

The 2008 financial crisis did not precipitate global retaliatory trade intervention, in seeming contrast to the Great Depression in 1930s. This article discusses the influence of model structure in optimal tariff (OT) calculations in explaining this puzzle. We emphasize how earlier literature reports high OTs in numerical calculation (of a hundred percent) but only uses simple trade models. We use numerical general equilibrium (GE) calibration and simulation methodology to calculate OTs both with and without retaliation in a series of observationally equivalent models and explore the influence of model structures on OT levels. We gradually add more realistic features into the basic GE model, and show sharply declined OTs, which suggests that trade retaliation incentives effectively disappear with the deepening of globalization in 2008 compared to 1930. (JEL codes: F11, C63, F13).

Suggested Citation

  • Chunding Li & John Whalley & Chuantian He & Chuangwei Lin, 2021. "The 2008 Financial Crisis and the Lack of Retaliatory Trade Intervention," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo Group, vol. 67(1), pages 78-105.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:cesifo:v:67:y:2021:i:1:p:78-105.
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/cesifo/ifaa012
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Eichengreen, Barry & Irwin, Douglas A., 2010. "The Slide to Protectionism in the Great Depression: Who Succumbed and Why?," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 70(4), pages 871-897, December.
    2. Terrie Walmsley, 1998. "LONG-RUN SIMULATIONS WITH GTAP: Illustrative Results from APEC Trade Liberalisation," Centre of Policy Studies/IMPACT Centre Working Papers ip-70, Victoria University, Centre of Policy Studies/IMPACT Centre.
    3. R. F. Kahn, 1947. "Tariffs and the Terms of Trade," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 15(1), pages 14-19.
    4. Willenbockel, Dirk, 1999. "Dynamic applied general equilibrium trade policy analysis in the presence of foreign asset cross-ownership," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 371-388, August.
    5. Krugman, Paul, 1980. "Scale Economies, Product Differentiation, and the Pattern of Trade," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 70(5), pages 950-959, December.
    6. Kuga, Kiyoshi, 1973. "Tariff retaliation and policy equilibrium," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 351-366, November.
    7. Jonathan Eaton & Gene M. Grossman, 1985. "Tariffs as Insurance: Optimal Commercial Policy When Domestic Markets Are Incomplete," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 18(2), pages 258-272, May.
    8. Dennis Novy, 2013. "Gravity Redux: Measuring International Trade Costs With Panel Data," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 51(1), pages 101-121, January.
    9. Soderbery, Anson, 2018. "Trade elasticities, heterogeneity, and optimal tariffs," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 44-62.
    10. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1995. "Trade Wars and Trade Talks," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(4), pages 675-708, August.
    11. W. M. Gorman, 1958. "Tariffs, Retaliation, and the Elasticity of Demand for Imports," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 25(3), pages 133-162.
    12. Whalley, John & Wang, Li, 2011. "The impacts of Renminbi appreciation on trade flows and reserve accumulation in a monetary trade model," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 28(1-2), pages 614-621, January.
    13. Eichengreen, Barry & Sachs, Jeffrey, 1985. "Exchange Rates and Economic Recovery in the 1930s," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 45(4), pages 925-946, December.
    14. Ralph Ossa, 2014. "Trade Wars and Trade Talks with Data," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(12), pages 4104-4146, December.
    15. Andrew B. Bernard & Jonathan Eaton & J. Bradford Jensen & Samuel Kortum, 2003. "Plants and Productivity in International Trade," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(4), pages 1268-1290, September.
    16. Arnaud Costinot & Dave Donaldson & Jonathan Vogel & Iván Werning, 2015. "Comparative Advantage and Optimal Trade Policy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 130(2), pages 659-702.
    17. Carlo Perroni & John Whalley, 2000. "The new regionalism: trade liberalization or insurance?," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 33(1), pages 1-24, February.
    18. Bernanke, Ben S, 1995. "The Macroeconomics of the Great Depression: A Comparative Approach," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 27(1), pages 1-28, February.
    19. Francois, Joseph & Bradley McDonald, 1996. "Liberalization and Capital Accumulation in the GTAP Model," GTAP Technical Papers 310, Center for Global Trade Analysis, Department of Agricultural Economics, Purdue University.
    20. John Kennan & Raymond Riezman, 2013. "Do Big Countries Win Tariff Wars?," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Raymond Riezman (ed.), International Trade Agreements and Political Economy, chapter 4, pages 45-51, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    21. Hamilton, Bob & Whalley, John, 1983. "Optimal tariff calculations in alternative trade models and some possible implications for current world trading arrangements," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(3-4), pages 323-348, November.
    22. Lapan, Harvey E, 1988. "The Optimal Tariff, Production Lags, and Time Consistency," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(3), pages 395-401, June.
    23. Thomas Chaney, 2008. "Distorted Gravity: The Intensive and Extensive Margins of International Trade," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(4), pages 1707-1721, September.
    24. Felbermayr, Gabriel & Jung, Benjamin & Larch, Mario, 2013. "Optimal tariffs, retaliation, and the welfare loss from tariff wars in the Melitz model," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(1), pages 13-25.
    25. Jonathan Eaton & Samuel Kortum, 2002. "Technology, Geography, and Trade," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(5), pages 1741-1779, September.
    26. Eichengreen, Barry & Irwin, Douglas A., 1995. "Trade blocs, currency blocs and the reorientation of world trade in the 1930s," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(1-2), pages 1-24, February.
    27. Christian Broda & Nuno Limão & David E. Weinstein, 2018. "Optimal Tariffs and Market Power: The Evidence," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Policy Externalities and International Trade Agreements, chapter 2, pages 13-46, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    28. Chunding Li & John Whalley, 2014. "China and the Trans-Pacific Partnership: A Numerical Simulation Assessment of the Effects Involved," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(2), pages 169-192, February.
    29. Harry G. Johnson, 1953. "Optimum Tariffs and Retaliation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 21(2), pages 142-153.
    30. James E. Anderson & Eric van Wincoop, 2001. "Borders, Trade and Welfare," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 508, Boston College Department of Economics.
    31. Shoven,John B. & Whalley,John, 1992. "Applying General Equilibrium," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521266550, January.
    32. Markusen, James R & Wigle, Randall M, 1989. "Nash Equilibrium Tariffs for the United States and Canada: The Roles of Country Size, Scale Economies, and Capital Mobility," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(2), pages 368-386, April.
    33. Walmsley, Terrie L., 2002. "Incorporating international ownership of endowments into a global applied general equilibrium model," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 19(5), pages 679-707, November.
    34. Marc J. Melitz, 2003. "The Impact of Trade on Intra-Industry Reallocations and Aggregate Industry Productivity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(6), pages 1695-1725, November.
    35. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/6apm7lruv088iagm4rv2c33jtg is not listed on IDEAS
    36. Whalley John & Yu Jun & Zhang Shunming, 2012. "Trade Retaliation in a Monetary-Trade Model," Global Economy Journal, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-29, March.
    37. Constantinos Syropoulos, 2002. "Optimum Tariffs and Retaliation Revisited: How Country Size Matters," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 69(3), pages 707-727.
    38. Hamilton, James D., 1987. "Monetary factors in the great depression," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 145-169, March.
    39. Yu, Jun & Zhang, Shunming, 2011. "Optimal trade policy in tariff games with inside money," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 1604-1614, July.
    40. Ralph Ossa, 2016. "Quantitative Models of Commercial Policy," NBER Working Papers 22062, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. He, Chuantian & Li, Chunding & Wang, Jing & Whalley, John, 2017. "The Armington assumption and the size of optimal tariffs," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 214-222.
    2. Lashkaripour, Ahmad, 2021. "The cost of a global tariff war: A sufficient statistics approach," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 131(C).
    3. Ralph Ossa, 2011. "A "New Trade" Theory of GATT/WTO Negotiations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 119(1), pages 122-152.
    4. Ralph Ossa, 2016. "Quantitative Models of Commercial Policy," NBER Working Papers 22062, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Hajime Takatsuka & Dao‐Zhi Zeng, 2022. "Mobile capital, optimal tariff, and tariff war," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(1), pages 166-204, February.
    6. Hübler, Michael & Pothen, Frank, 2017. "Trade-induced productivity gains reduce incentives to impose strategic tariffs," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 420-431.
    7. Costinot, Arnaud & Rodríguez-Clare, Andrés, 2014. "Trade Theory with Numbers: Quantifying the Consequences of Globalization," Handbook of International Economics, in: Gopinath, G. & Helpman, . & Rogoff, K. (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 0, pages 197-261, Elsevier.
    8. Takumi Naito, 2021. "Can The Optimal Tariff Be Zero For A Growing Large Country?," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 62(3), pages 1237-1280, August.
    9. Arnaud Costinot & Andrés Rodríguez‐Clare & Iván Werning, 2020. "Micro to Macro: Optimal Trade Policy With Firm Heterogeneity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(6), pages 2739-2776, November.
    10. Felbermayr, Gabriel & Jung, Benjamin & Larch, Mario, 2013. "Optimal tariffs, retaliation, and the welfare loss from tariff wars in the Melitz model," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(1), pages 13-25.
    11. Opp, Marcus M., 2010. "Tariff wars in the Ricardian Model with a continuum of goods," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 212-225, March.
    12. Bergstrand, Jeffrey H. & Cray, Stephen R. & Gervais, Antoine, 2023. "Increasing marginal costs, firm heterogeneity, and the gains from “deep” international trade agreements," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 144(C).
    13. Jeffrey H. Bergstrand & Stephen R. Cray & Antoine Gervais, 2023. "Increasing Marginal Costs, Firm Heterogeneity,and the Gains from "Deep" International Trade Agreements," Cahiers de recherche 23-01, Departement d'économique de l'École de gestion à l'Université de Sherbrooke.
    14. Mario Larch & Wolfgang Lechthaler, 2013. "Whom to send to Doha? The Short-sighted Ones!," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 16(4), pages 634-649, October.
    15. Chunding Li, 2017. "How Would Bilateral Trade Retaliation Affect China?," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 49(3), pages 459-479, March.
    16. Bolatto, Stefano & Moramarco, Graziano, 2023. "Gains from trade and their quantification: Does sectoral disaggregation matter?," International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 174(C), pages 44-68.
    17. Nocco, Antonella & Ottaviano, Gianmarco I.P. & Salto, Matteo, 2019. "Geography, competition, and optimal multilateral trade policy," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 145-161.
    18. Hübler, Michael & Pothen, Frank, 2013. "The optimal tariff in the presence of trade-induced productivity gains," ZEW Discussion Papers 13-103, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    19. Yan Dong & John Whalley, 2011. "Optimal tariff calculations in tariff games with climate change considerations," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 18(15), pages 1431-1435.
    20. Takumi Naito, 2019. "A larger country sets a lower optimal tariff," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(2), pages 643-665, May.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    optimal tariffs; general equilibrium; model structure; trade liberalization;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computational Techniques
    • F11 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Neoclassical Models of Trade
    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:cesifo:v:67:y:2021:i:1:p:78-105.. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Oxford University Press (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cesifde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.