IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/cesifo/v67y2021i1p78-105..html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The 2008 Financial Crisis and the Lack of Retaliatory Trade Intervention

Author

Listed:
  • Chunding Li
  • John Whalley
  • Chuantian He
  • Chuangwei Lin

Abstract

The 2008 financial crisis did not precipitate global retaliatory trade intervention, in seeming contrast to the Great Depression in 1930s. This article discusses the influence of model structure in optimal tariff (OT) calculations in explaining this puzzle. We emphasize how earlier literature reports high OTs in numerical calculation (of a hundred percent) but only uses simple trade models. We use numerical general equilibrium (GE) calibration and simulation methodology to calculate OTs both with and without retaliation in a series of observationally equivalent models and explore the influence of model structures on OT levels. We gradually add more realistic features into the basic GE model, and show sharply declined OTs, which suggests that trade retaliation incentives effectively disappear with the deepening of globalization in 2008 compared to 1930. (JEL codes: F11, C63, F13).

Suggested Citation

  • Chunding Li & John Whalley & Chuantian He & Chuangwei Lin, 2021. "The 2008 Financial Crisis and the Lack of Retaliatory Trade Intervention," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo Group, vol. 67(1), pages 78-105.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:cesifo:v:67:y:2021:i:1:p:78-105.
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/cesifo/ifaa012
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Eichengreen, Barry & Irwin, Douglas A., 2010. "The Slide to Protectionism in the Great Depression: Who Succumbed and Why?," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 70(4), pages 871-897, December.
    2. Terrie Walmsley, 1998. "LONG-RUN SIMULATIONS WITH GTAP: Illustrative Results from APEC Trade Liberalisation," Centre of Policy Studies/IMPACT Centre Working Papers ip-70, Victoria University, Centre of Policy Studies/IMPACT Centre.
    3. R. F. Kahn, 1947. "Tariffs and the Terms of Trade," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 15(1), pages 14-19.
    4. Willenbockel, Dirk, 1999. "Dynamic applied general equilibrium trade policy analysis in the presence of foreign asset cross-ownership," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 371-388, August.
    5. Kuga, Kiyoshi, 1973. "Tariff retaliation and policy equilibrium," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 351-366, November.
    6. Jonathan Eaton & Gene M. Grossman, 1985. "Tariffs as Insurance: Optimal Commercial Policy When Domestic Markets Are Incomplete," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 18(2), pages 258-272, May.
    7. Dennis Novy, 2013. "Gravity Redux: Measuring International Trade Costs With Panel Data," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 51(1), pages 101-121, January.
    8. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1995. "Trade Wars and Trade Talks," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(4), pages 675-708, August.
    9. W. M. Gorman, 1958. "Tariffs, Retaliation, and the Elasticity of Demand for Imports," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 25(3), pages 133-162.
    10. Eichengreen, Barry & Sachs, Jeffrey, 1985. "Exchange Rates and Economic Recovery in the 1930s," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 45(4), pages 925-946, December.
    11. Andrew B. Bernard & Jonathan Eaton & J. Bradford Jensen & Samuel Kortum, 2003. "Plants and Productivity in International Trade," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(4), pages 1268-1290, September.
    12. Carlo Perroni & John Whalley, 2000. "The new regionalism: trade liberalization or insurance?," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 33(1), pages 1-24, February.
    13. Bernanke, Ben S, 1995. "The Macroeconomics of the Great Depression: A Comparative Approach," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 27(1), pages 1-28, February.
    14. Francois, Joseph & Bradley McDonald, 1996. "Liberalization and Capital Accumulation in the GTAP Model," GTAP Technical Papers 310, Center for Global Trade Analysis, Department of Agricultural Economics, Purdue University.
    15. John Kennan & Raymond Riezman, 2013. "Do Big Countries Win Tariff Wars?," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Raymond Riezman (ed.), International Trade Agreements and Political Economy, chapter 4, pages 45-51, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    16. Hamilton, Bob & Whalley, John, 1983. "Optimal tariff calculations in alternative trade models and some possible implications for current world trading arrangements," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(3-4), pages 323-348, November.
    17. Lapan, Harvey E, 1988. "The Optimal Tariff, Production Lags, and Time Consistency," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(3), pages 395-401, June.
    18. Thomas Chaney, 2008. "Distorted Gravity: The Intensive and Extensive Margins of International Trade," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(4), pages 1707-1721, September.
    19. Eichengreen, Barry & Irwin, Douglas A., 1995. "Trade blocs, currency blocs and the reorientation of world trade in the 1930s," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(1-2), pages 1-24, February.
    20. Christian Broda & Nuno Limão & David E. Weinstein, 2018. "Optimal Tariffs and Market Power: The Evidence," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Policy Externalities and International Trade Agreements, chapter 2, pages 13-46, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    21. Chunding Li & John Whalley, 2014. "China and the Trans-Pacific Partnership: A Numerical Simulation Assessment of the Effects Involved," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(2), pages 169-192, February.
    22. James E. Anderson & Eric van Wincoop, 2001. "Borders, Trade and Welfare," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 508, Boston College Department of Economics.
    23. Shoven,John B. & Whalley,John, 1992. "Applying General Equilibrium," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521266550, January.
    24. Markusen, James R & Wigle, Randall M, 1989. "Nash Equilibrium Tariffs for the United States and Canada: The Roles of Country Size, Scale Economies, and Capital Mobility," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(2), pages 368-386, April.
    25. Walmsley, Terrie L., 2002. "Incorporating international ownership of endowments into a global applied general equilibrium model," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 19(5), pages 679-707, November.
    26. Whalley John & Yu Jun & Zhang Shunming, 2012. "Trade Retaliation in a Monetary-Trade Model," Global Economy Journal, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-29, March.
    27. Constantinos Syropoulos, 2002. "Optimum Tariffs and Retaliation Revisited: How Country Size Matters," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 69(3), pages 707-727.
    28. Hamilton, James D., 1987. "Monetary factors in the great depression," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 145-169, March.
    29. Yu, Jun & Zhang, Shunming, 2011. "Optimal trade policy in tariff games with inside money," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 1604-1614, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. He, Chuantian & Li, Chunding & Wang, Jing & Whalley, John, 2017. "The Armington assumption and the size of optimal tariffs," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 214-222.
    2. Chunding Li, 2017. "How Would Bilateral Trade Retaliation Affect China?," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 49(3), pages 459-479, March.
    3. Ralph Ossa, 2011. "A "New Trade" Theory of GATT/WTO Negotiations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 119(1), pages 122-152.
    4. Zissimos, Ben, 2009. "Optimum tariffs and retaliation: How country numbers matter," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(2), pages 276-286, July.
    5. Yan Dong & John Whalley, 2011. "Optimal tariff calculations in tariff games with climate change considerations," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 18(15), pages 1431-1435.
    6. Opp, Marcus M., 2010. "Tariff wars in the Ricardian Model with a continuum of goods," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 212-225, March.
    7. Francois, Joseph & Bekkers, Eddy & Nelson, Doug R & Rojas-Romagosa, Hugo, 2019. "Trade Wars: Nobody Expects the Spanish Inquisition," CEPR Discussion Papers 14079, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Chunding Li & Jing Wang & John Whalley, 2014. "Numerical General Equilibrium Analysis of China's Impacts from Possible Mega Trade Deals," NBER Working Papers 20425, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Mario Larch & Wolfgang Lechthaler, 2013. "Whom to send to Doha? The Short-sighted Ones!," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 16(4), pages 634-649, October.
    10. Hajime Takatsuka & Dao‐Zhi Zeng, 2022. "Mobile capital, optimal tariff, and tariff war," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(1), pages 166-204, February.
    11. Wong, Siu-kee, 2004. "Existence of trading Nash equilibrium in tariff retaliation models," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 47(3), pages 367-387, May.
    12. Chattopadhyay, Subir & Mitka, Malgorzata M., 2019. "Nash equilibrium in tariffs in a multi-country trade model," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 225-242.
    13. Richard S. Grossman & Christopher M. Meissner, 2010. "International aspects of the Great Depression and the crisis of 2007: similarities, differences, and lessons," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 26(3), pages 318-338, Autumn.
    14. Dong, Yan & Li, Chunding, 2018. "Economic sanction games among the US, the EU and Russia: Payoffs and potential effects," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 117-128.
    15. Staiger, Robert W., 1995. "International rules and institutions for trade policy," Handbook of International Economics, in: G. M. Grossman & K. Rogoff (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 29, pages 1495-1551, Elsevier.
    16. Felbermayr, Gabriel & Jung, Benjamin & Larch, Mario, 2013. "Optimal tariffs, retaliation, and the welfare loss from tariff wars in the Melitz model," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(1), pages 13-25.
    17. Martin Ellison & Sang Seok Lee & Kevin Hjortshøj O'Rourke, 2024. "The Ends of 27 Big Depressions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 114(1), pages 134-168, January.
    18. Mitchener, Kris James & Wandschneider, Kirsten, 2013. "Capital Controls and Recovery from the Financial Crisis of the 1930s," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 132, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
    19. Ghosh, Madanmohan, 2002. "The revival of regional trade arrangements: a GE evaluation of the impact on small countries," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 83-101, May.
    20. Chuantian He & Chunding Li & John Whalley, 2018. "General equilibrium trade modelling with Canada–US transportation costs," The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 27(7), pages 806-829, October.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    optimal tariffs; general equilibrium; model structure; trade liberalization;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computational Techniques
    • F11 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Neoclassical Models of Trade
    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:cesifo:v:67:y:2021:i:1:p:78-105.. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Oxford University Press (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cesifde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.