Rent Dissipation, Free Riding, and Trade Policy
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- Grossman, Gene M. & Helpman, Elhanan, 1996. "Rent dissipation, free riding, and trade policy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-5), pages 795-803, April.
- Grossman, Gene M. & Helpman, Elhanan, 1995. "Rent Dissipation, Free Riding, and Trade Policy," Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers 275607, Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research.
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- Paola Conconi & Carlo Perroni, 2012. "Conditional versus Unconditional Trade Concessions for Developing Countries," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/98541, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
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- Furtan, William Hartley & Jensen, Maria Skovager & Sauer, Johannes, 2008. "Rent Seeking and the Common Agricultural Policy: Do member countries free ride on lobbying?," 107th Seminar, January 30-February 1, 2008, Sevilla, Spain 6600, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
- Baldwin, Robert Edward & Baldwin, Richard Edward, 1996. "Alternate approaches to the political economy of endogenous trade liberalization," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-5), pages 775-782, April.
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- Furtan, H. & Jensen, M.S. & Sauer, J., 2009. "Rent Seeking and the Common Agricultural Policy: Do member countries free ride in lobying?," Proceedings “Schriften der Gesellschaft für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften des Landbaues e.V.”, German Association of Agricultural Economists (GEWISOLA), vol. 44, March.
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- Kara M. Reynolds, 2009. "Overcoming Free Riding: A Cross Country Analysis of Firm Participation in Antidumping Petitions," Working Papers 2009-01, American University, Department of Economics.
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- Limao, Nuno & Panagariya, Arvind, 2007. "Inequality and endogenous trade policy outcomes," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 292-309, July.
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Keywords
FREE TRADE; MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES;Statistics
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