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Shortening university career fades the signal away. Evidence from Italy

Author

Listed:
  • Carolina Castagnetti

    (Department of Economics and Quantitative Methods, University of Pavia)

  • Silvia Dal Bianco

    (Department of Economics and Quantitative Methods, University of Pavia)

  • Luisa Rosti

    (Department of Economics and Quantitative Methods, University of Pavia)

Abstract

Italian university system was reformed in 2001. This paper tests the screening role of degree scores for 2004-Italian graduates. We find support of the strong screening hypothesis for prereform type degrees, while we do not find any evidence of signalling effects for post-reform 3-years degrees. We gauge that the shutting down of the signal can be partially ascribed to the poor quality of students who obtained a 3-years degree without taking any further education.

Suggested Citation

  • Carolina Castagnetti & Silvia Dal Bianco & Luisa Rosti, 2011. "Shortening university career fades the signal away. Evidence from Italy," Quaderni di Dipartimento 146, University of Pavia, Department of Economics and Quantitative Methods.
    • Handle: RePEc:pav:wpaper:146
    as

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    File URL: http://dem-web.unipv.it/web/docs/dipeco/quad/ps/RePEc/pav/wpaper/q146.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Screening; Italy; Higher Education;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I23 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Higher Education; Research Institutions
    • J08 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - General - - - Labor Economics Policies

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