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Is it a Norm to Favour Your Own Group?

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  • Donna Harris
  • Benedikt Herrmann
  • Andreas Kontoleon
  • Jonathan Newtonor

Abstract

This paper examines the relationship between norm enforcement and in-group favouritism behaviour. Using a new two-stage allocation experiment with punishments, we investigate whether in-group favouritism is considered as a social norm in itself or as a violation of a different norm, such as egalitarian norm. We find that which norm of behaviour is enforced depends on who the punisher is. If the punishers belong to the in-group, in-group favouritism is considered a norm and it does not get punished. If the punishers belong to the out-group, in-group favouritism is frequently punished. If the punishers belong to no group and merely observe in-group favouritism (the third-party), they do not seem to care sufficiently to be willing to punish this behavour. Our results shed a new light on the effectiveness of altruistic norm enforcement when group identities are taken into account and help to explain why in-group favouritism is widespread across societies.

Suggested Citation

  • Donna Harris & Benedikt Herrmann & Andreas Kontoleon & Jonathan Newtonor, 2014. "Is it a Norm to Favour Your Own Group?," Economics Series Working Papers 719, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:oxf:wpaper:719
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    4. Cadsby, C. Bram & Du, Ninghua & Song, Fei, 2016. "In-group favoritism and moral decision-making," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 59-71.
    5. Paetzel, Fabian & Sausgruber, Rupert, 2018. "Cognitive ability and in-group bias: An experimental study," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 280-292.
    6. Shaun P. Hargreaves Heap & Eugenio Levi & Abhijit Ramalingam, 2021. "Group identification and giving: in-group love, out-group hate and their crowding out," MUNI ECON Working Papers 2021-07, Masaryk University, revised Feb 2023.
    7. Aksoy, Billur & Palma, Marco A., 2019. "The effects of scarcity on cheating and in-group favoritism," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 100-117.
    8. Gцnьl Dogan & Luke Glowacki & Hannes Rusch, 2020. "Ingroup Love Drives Ingroup Bias within Natural Groups," Working Paper Series in Economics 101, University of Cologne, Department of Economics.
    9. Crawford, Ian & Harris, Donna, 2018. "Social interactions and the influence of “extremists”," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 238-266.
    10. Oppel, Annalena, 2021. "Normalizing necessity? Support networks and racial inequality in Namibia," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 147(C).
    11. Deffains, Bruno & Espinosa, Romain & Fluet, Claude, 2019. "Laws and norms: Experimental evidence with liability rules," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).
    12. Solferino, Nazaria & Taurino, SerenaFiona & Tessitore, M.Elisabetta, 2016. "Boosting cooperation between agents in diverse groups: a dynamical model of prosocial behavior, free-riding and coercive solutions," MPRA Paper 71283, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Barr, Abigail & Lane, Tom & Nosenzo, Daniele, 2018. "On the social inappropriateness of discrimination," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 164(C), pages 153-164.
    14. Thomas, Ranjeeta & Galizzi, Matteo M. & Moorhouse, Louisa & Nyamukapa, Constance & Hallett, Timothy B., 2024. "Do risk, time and prosocial preferences predict risky sexual behaviour of youths in a low-income, high-risk setting?," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(C).
    15. Müller, Daniel, 2019. "The anatomy of distributional preferences with group identity," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 785-807.
    16. Billur Aksoy & Marco A. Palma, "undated". "The Effects of Scarcity on Cheating and In-Group Favoritism," Working Papers 20180918-001, Texas A&M University, Department of Economics.
    17. Lu Dong & Lingbo Huang, 2018. "Favoritism and Fairness in Teams," Games, MDPI, vol. 9(3), pages 1-15, September.
    18. Artavia-Mora, Luis & Bedi, Arjun S. & Rieger, Matthias, 2018. "Help, Prejudice and Headscarves," IZA Discussion Papers 11460, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    19. Paetzel, Fabian & Sausgruber, Rupert, 2017. "Entitlements and Loyalty in Groups: An Experimental Study," VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168224, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    20. Annalena Oppel, 2021. "Exploring economic support networks amidst racial inequality in Namibia," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2021-102, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    In-group Favouritism; Group Identity; Social Norms; In-group Punishment; Out-group Punishment; Third-party Punishment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption

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