IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/osf/socarx/hu3vq.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Taxes in the Time of Revolution: An Experimental Test of the Rentier State during Algeria's Hirak

Author

Listed:
  • Kubinec, Robert

    (New York University Abu Dhabi)

  • Milner, Helen

Abstract

In this paper we examine the rentier thesis that a state's control over oil resources should help it resist calls for democratization. During Algeria's mass mobilization for regime change known as the Hirak in 2019, we implemented an interactive experimental treatment providing specific information about the Algerian government's high subsidies of gasoline and low value-added taxes with regional comparisons. Based on a sample of 5,968 Algerians, we find that when Algerians learn about their country's relatively high level of fuel subsidies and low level of taxes, their assessments of the government's performance improves; however, we do not see similar patterns for respondents' expressed intention to join the protests due to treatment heterogeneity defined by respondent wealth. Wealthier respondents report lower protest intentions upon learning about the scope of the rentier state, whereas poorer respondents report much higher protest intentions upon receiving the treatment. As a result, we find that the rentier state may be capable of improving perceptions of regime performance, yet still permit mass mobilization if there are class differences in the perceived benefits derived from redistribution.

Suggested Citation

  • Kubinec, Robert & Milner, Helen, 2021. "Taxes in the Time of Revolution: An Experimental Test of the Rentier State during Algeria's Hirak," SocArXiv hu3vq, Center for Open Science.
    • Handle: RePEc:osf:socarx:hu3vq
    DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/hu3vq
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://osf.io/download/61c86bcb72da230374bfa797/
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.31219/osf.io/hu3vq?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gandhi,Jennifer, 2008. "Political Institutions under Dictatorship," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521897952, November.
    2. Haggard, Stephan & Kaufman, Robert R., 2012. "Inequality and Regime Change: Democratic Transitions and the Stability of Democratic Rule," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 106(3), pages 495-516, August.
    3. Acemoglu,Daron & Robinson,James A., 2009. "Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521671422, November.
    4. Corden, W M, 1984. "Booming Sector and Dutch Disease Economics: Survey and Consolidation," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 36(3), pages 359-380, November.
    5. Ansell,Ben W. & Samuels,David J., 2014. "Inequality and Democratization," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107000360, November.
    6. Gehlbach, Scott & Keefer, Philip, 2011. "Investment without democracy: Ruling-party institutionalization and credible commitment in autocracies," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 123-139, June.
    7. Wang, Wei & Rothschild, David & Goel, Sharad & Gelman, Andrew, 2015. "Forecasting elections with non-representative polls," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 980-991.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Michael Albertus & Victor Gay, 2019. "No better time than now: Future uncertainty and private investment under dictatorship," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(1), pages 71-96, March.
    2. Dorsch, Michael T. & Maarek, Paul, 2020. "Economic downturns, inequality, and democratic improvements," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
    3. Michael K Miller, 2013. "Electoral authoritarianism and democracy: A formal model of regime transitions," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 25(2), pages 153-181, April.
    4. Jacque Gao, 2022. "Investment with insecure property rights: Capital outflow openness under dictatorship," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 569-595, July.
    5. Sergei Guriev & Daniel Treisman, 2015. "How Modern Dictators Survive: Cooptation, Censorship, Propaganda, and Repression," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03473701, HAL.
    6. Michael Albertus & Victor Gay, 2017. "Unlikely Democrats: Economic Elite Uncertainty under Dictatorship and Support for Democratization," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 61(3), pages 624-641, July.
    7. Anne Meng, 2019. "Accessing the state: Executive constraints and credible commitment in dictatorship," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 31(4), pages 568-599, October.
    8. Israel Marques II, 2022. "Skipping Out On The Check: Institutional Quality, Tax Evasion, And Individual Preferences For Social Policy," HSE Working papers WP BRP 85/PS/2022, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    9. Dorsch, Michael T. & Maarek, Paul, 2019. "Democratization and the Conditional Dynamics of Income Distribution," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 113(2), pages 385-404, May.
    10. Mario, Gilli & Yuan, Li, 2018. "Transitions and Political Stability in Autocracies. The Role of Public Perception," Working Papers 383, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised 13 Jul 2018.
    11. Li, Yuan & Gilli, Mario, 2014. "Accountability in Autocracies: The Role of Revolution Threat," Stockholm School of Economics Asia Working Paper Series 2014-30, Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm China Economic Research Institute, revised 06 Mar 2014.
    12. Bautista, M. A. & González, F. & Martínez, L. R. & Muñoz, P. & Prem, M., 2020. "Chile’s Missing Students: Dictatorship, Higher Education and Social Mobility," Documentos de Trabajo 18163, Universidad del Rosario.
    13. Sergei Guriev & Daniel Treisman, 2015. "How Modern Dictators Survive: An Informational Theory of the New Authoritarianism," NBER Working Papers 21136, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    14. Neundorf, Anja & Gerschewski, Johannes & Olar, Roman-Gabriel, 2020. "How Do Inclusionary and Exclusionary Autocracies Affect Ordinary People?," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 53(12), pages 1890-1925.
    15. Guriev, Sergei & Treisman, Daniel, 2020. "A theory of informational autocracy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 186(C).
    16. Dorsch, Michael & Dunz, Karl & Maarek, Paul, 2012. "Asymmetric Information and Inefficient Regulation of Firms Under the Threat of Revolution," MPRA Paper 38879, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    17. Nobuhiro Mizuno & Katsuyuki Naito & Ryosuke Okazawa, 2017. "Inequality, extractive institutions, and growth in nondemocratic regimes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 170(1), pages 115-142, January.
    18. Li, Yuan, 2013. "Downward Accountability in Response to Collective Actions: The Political Economy of Public Goods Provision in China," Stockholm School of Economics Asia Working Paper Series 2013-26, Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm China Economic Research Institute.
    19. Park, Hyungmin, 2023. "Developmental Dictatorship and Middle Class-driven Democratisation," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1485, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    20. Lavezzolo, Sebastián & Rodríguez-Lluesma, Carlos & Elvira, Marta M., 2018. "National culture and financial systems: The conditioning role of political context," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 60-72.

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:osf:socarx:hu3vq. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: OSF (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://arabixiv.org .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.