Taxes in the Time of Revolution: An Experimental Test of the Rentier State during Algeria's Hirak

We examine the rentier thesis that a government’s control over oil resources should help it resist pressures for democratization. Our online survey experiment, implemented during a nationwide mobilization for regime change in Algeria known as the Hirak, used interactive experimental treatments to provide information about the Algerian government’s subsidies for fuel resources and low value-added taxes. Based on a sample of 9,721 Algerians, we find that when Algerians learn about their country’s relatively high level of fuel subsidies and low level of taxes, their assessments of the government’s performance improve. However, we find null effects for outcomes involving demands for representation such as intentions to join protest movements. An analysis of treatment heterogeneity in terms of wealth shows that the wealthy became much more supportive of the regime in response to the treatment while in some cases the poor became much less so. This treatment heterogeneity appears to be related to divergent views among the wealthy and the poor concerning the goals of the protest movement, with the wealthy favoring institutional reforms while the poor prioritized redistributive justice.