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Whether or not to open Pandora's box

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  • Laura Doval

Abstract

Weitzman's [15] search model requires that, conditional on stopping, the agent only takes boxes which have already been inspected. We relax this assumption and allow the agent to take any uninspected box without inspecting its contents when stopping. Thus, each uninspected box is now a potential outside option. This introduces a new trade-off: every time the agent inspects a box, he loses the value of the option to take it without inspection. Nevertheless, we find that, under conditions common in the search and information acquisition literature, boxes are inspected following the same order as in Weitzman's rule; however, the stopping rule is different, and we characterize it. Moreover, we provide additional results that partially characterize the optimal policy when these conditions fail.

Suggested Citation

  • Laura Doval, 2014. "Whether or not to open Pandora's box," Discussion Papers 1574, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  • Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1574
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    search; information acquisition JEL Classification: D83;

    JEL classification:

    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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