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Whether or not to open Pandora's box

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Mark Armstrong, 2017. "Ordered Consumer Search," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 15(5), pages 989-1024.
  2. Elchanan Ben-Porath & Eddie Dekel & Barton L. Lipman, 2014. "Optimal Allocation with Costly Verification," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(12), pages 3779-3813, December.
  3. Ziv Scully & Laura Doval, 2024. "Local hedging approximately solves Pandora's box problems with nonobligatory inspection," Papers 2410.19011, arXiv.org.
  4. Liang Guo, 2021. "Endogenous Evaluation and Sequential Search," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 40(3), pages 413-427, May.
  5. Grenet, Julien & He, YingHua & Kübler, Dorothea, 2022. "Preference Discovery in University Admissions: The Case for Dynamic Multioffer Mechanisms," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 130(6), pages 1-1.
  6. Pak Hung Au & Mark Whitmeyer, 2018. "Attraction versus Persuasion: Information Provision in Search Markets," Papers 1802.09396, arXiv.org, revised May 2022.
  7. Hedyeh Beyhaghi & Linda Cai, 2023. "Recent Developments in Pandora's Box Problem: Variants and Applications," Papers 2308.12242, arXiv.org.
  8. Noda, Shunya, 2022. "Strategic experimentation with random serial dictatorship," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 115-125.
  9. Ke, T. Tony & Villas-Boas, J. Miguel, 2019. "Optimal learning before choice," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 383-437.
  10. Manuel Mueller-Frank & Mallesh M. Pai, 2016. "Social Learning with Costly Search," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(1), pages 83-109, February.
  11. Rustamdjan Hakimov & Dorothea Kübler & Siqi Pan, 2023. "Costly information acquisition in centralized matching markets," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(4), pages 1447-1490, November.
  12. Li, Yunan, 2020. "Mechanism design with costly verification and limited punishments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 186(C).
  13. Grenet, Julien & He, Yinghua & Kübler, Dorothea, 2019. "Decentralizing centralized matching markets: Implications from early offers in university admissions," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2019-208, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
  14. Greminger, Rafael, 2019. "Optimal Search and Awareness Expansion," Other publications TiSEM ac47e6ff-42a4-4d70-addd-6, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  15. Weijie Zhong, 2022. "Optimal Dynamic Information Acquisition," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(4), pages 1537-1582, July.
  16. T. Tony Ke & Song Lin, 2020. "Informational Complementarity," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(8), pages 3699-3716, August.
  17. Fudenberg, Drew & He, Kevin, 2021. "Player-compatible learning and player-compatible equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 194(C).
  18. Efthymios Lykopoulos & Georgios Voucharas & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2022. "Pandora’s rules in the laboratory," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 25(5), pages 1492-1514, November.
  19. Rafael P. Greminger, 2019. "Optimal Search and Discovery," Papers 1911.07773, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2022.
  20. Dellis, Arnaud, 2023. "Legislative informational lobbying," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 208(C).
  21. Geoffrey A. Chua & Gaoji Hu & Fang Liu, 2023. "Optimal multi-unit allocation with costly verification," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 61(3), pages 455-488, October.
  22. Chen, Yanbin & Li, Sanxi & Lin, Kai & Yu, Jun, 2021. "Consumer search with blind buying," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 402-427.
  23. Petrikaitė, Vaiva, 2022. "Escaping search when buying," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 82(C).
  24. Rafael P. Greminger, 2022. "Optimal Search and Discovery," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(5), pages 3904-3924, May.
  25. Minghua Chen & Konstantinos Serfes & Eleftherios Zacharias, 2023. "Prices as signals of product quality in a duopoly," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(1), pages 1-31, March.
  26. Maxey, Tyler, 2024. "School choice with costly information acquisition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 248-268.
  27. Greminger, Rafael, 2019. "Optimal Search and Awareness Expansion," Discussion Paper 2019-034, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  28. Christoph Carnehl & Johannes Schneider, 2021. "On Risk and Time Pressure: When to Think and When to Do," Papers 2111.07451, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2022.
  29. Yunan Li, 2017. "Mechanism Design with Costly Verification and Limited Punishments, Third Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 16-009, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 28 Sep 2017.
  30. Agastya, Murali & Feng, Xin & Lu, Jingfeng, 2023. "Auction design with shortlisting when value discovery is covert," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(C).
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