Threats Without Binding Commitment
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Other versions of this item:
- Steven Shavell & Kathryn Spier, 1996. "Threats without Binding Commitment," NBER Working Papers 5461, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
References listed on IDEAS
- Klein, Daniel B. & O'Flaherty, Brendan, 1993.
"A game-theoretic rendering of promises and threats,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 295-314, August.
- Klein, D.B., 1991. "A Game-Theoretic rendering of Promises and Threats," Papers 90-91-21, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
Citations
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Cited by:
- Konstantin Sonin, 2008.
"A Theory of Brinkmanship, Conflicts, and Commitments,"
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 24(1), pages 163-183, May.
- Sonin, Konstantin & Schwarz, Michael, 2005. "A Theory of Brinkmanship, Conflicts, and Commitments," CEPR Discussion Papers 5075, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Farmer, Amy & Pecorino, Paul, 1998. "A reputation for being a nuisance: frivolous lawsuits and fee shifting in a repeated play game," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 147-157, June.
- Gomez, Fernando & Ganuza, Juan-Jose, 2002. "Civil and criminal sanctions against blackmail: an economic analysis," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(4), pages 475-498, May.
- Michele Moretto & Paola Valbonesi, 2004.
"Opting-out in profit-sharing regulation,"
Industrial Organization
0403001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Michele Moretto & Paola Valbonesi, 2004. "Opting-out in profit-sharing regulation," Industrial Organization 0403002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Vafai, Kouroche, 2002. "Preventing abuse of authority in hierarchies," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(8), pages 1143-1166, October.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
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